Inspektor Gadget: Unprivileged container can crash USDT note parser via crafted ELF

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Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. From 0.28.0 until 0.53.1, the USDT note parser in pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go can allow an unprivileged container to crash or exhaust the memory of the privileged Inspektor Gadget process when a custom gadget containing a SEC("usdt/...") eBPF section attaches to a crafted ELF binary. The getUsdtInfo() function reads the .note.stapsdt section without validating that DescSize is large enough for three address fields, allowing an out-of-bounds slice operation to panic, and it uses untrusted NameSize and DescSize values for allocations that can consume gigabytes of memory. The parser also invokes debug/elf without panic recovery, allowing other malformed ELF structures to terminate the process. No gadget shipped by Inspektor Gadget uses USDT probes, so only deployments using custom USDT gadgets are affected, and the demonstrated impact is denial of service rather than code execution or privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in version 0.53.1.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 17:00:33 UTC

Source modified

17 Sep 2026 16:19:41 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. From 0.28.0 until 0.53.1, the USDT note parser in pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go can allow an unprivileged container to crash or exhaust the memory of the privileged Inspektor Gadget process when a custom gadget containing a SEC("usdt/...") eBPF section attaches to a crafted ELF binary. The getUsdtInfo() function reads the .note.stapsdt section without validating that DescSize is large enough for three address fields, allowing an out-of-bounds slice operation to panic, and it uses untrusted NameSize and DescSize values for allocations that can consume gigabytes of memory. The parser also invokes debug/elf without panic recovery, allowing other malformed ELF structures to terminate the process. No gadget shipped by Inspektor Gadget uses USDT probes, so only deployments using custom USDT gadgets are affected, and the demonstrated impact is denial of service rather than code execution or privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in version 0.53.1.

Source published

Sep 15, 2026, 5:00:33 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 17, 2026, 4:19:41 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 12:01:10 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Inspektor Gadget is a set of tools and framework for data collection and system inspection on Kubernetes clusters and Linux hosts using eBPF. From 0.28.0 until 0.53.1, the USDT note parser in pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go can allow an unprivileged container to crash or exhaust the memory of the privileged Inspektor Gadget process when a custom gadget containing a SEC("usdt/...") eBPF section attaches to a crafted ELF binary. The getUsdtInfo() function reads the .note.stapsdt section without validating that DescSize is large enough for three address fields, allowing an out-of-bounds slice operation to panic, and it uses untrusted NameSize and DescSize values for allocations that can consume gigabytes of memory. The parser also invokes debug/elf without panic recovery, allowing other malformed ELF structures to terminate the process. No gadget shipped by Inspektor Gadget uses USDT probes, so only deployments using custom USDT gadgets are affected, and the demonstrated impact is denial of service rather than code execution or privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in version 0.53.1.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 17:17:14 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 17:43:24 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 10:17:27 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 2.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

## Summary A malicious container can crash or destabilize the privileged Inspektor Gadget process when a **gadget using USDT probes** is deployed. The vulnerability is in the USDT note parser (`pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`) which is invoked when a gadget with a `SEC("usdt/...")` section attaches to a target binary. An unprivileged process can place a crafted ELF binary at the expected library path, triggering one of two attack vectors: 1. **Panic (immediate crash):** A stapsdt note with a small `DescSize` causes an out-of-bounds slice access, panicking the IG process. 2. **Memory exhaustion (OOM kill):** A stapsdt note with a very large `NameSize` or `DescSize` causes IG to allocate up to ~4 GiB of memory, which can killnthe process if deployed with memory restrictions (e.g., cgroup limits). **Important:** The vulnerability is only triggered when running a gadget that uses USDT probes (i.e., contains a `SEC("usdt/...")` eBPF section). No gadget shipped by the Inspektor Gadget project uses USDT today. Users who deploy their own custom USDT gadgets are affected. ## Severity **Low** — Denial of Service (process crash or OOM) of a privileged host process, triggered by an unprivileged container. The vulnerable code path is only reached when a gadget using USDT probes is deployed. No such gadget is shipped by the Inspektor Gadget project; only users running custom USDT gadgets are affected. - **Attack vector**: An unprivileged process in a container places a crafted ELF file at a path that a USDT gadget targets (e.g., a library name resolved via the container's ld cache). When the gadget attaches, IG parses the malicious ELF and crashes. - **Impact**: The IG process panics and crashes (vector 1) or is OOM-killed (vector 2). This is a DoS against the monitoring infrastructure, not a code execution or privilege escalation vulnerability. - **Affected component**: `pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`, function `getUsdtInfo()` - **Prerequisites**: A gadget with a `SEC("usdt/...")` eBPF section must be running and configured to attach to a library inside the attacker's container. **No shipped gadgets use USDT probes**, so this only affects deployments with custom USDT gadgets. ## Affected Versions All versions of Inspektor Gadget that include USDT support in `pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`, starting from v0.28.0 (commit 7ee5e7a90 "pkg/uprobetracer: support USDT trace points"). ## Root Cause ### Vector 1: Out-of-bounds slice access (panic) In `pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`, the function `getUsdtInfo()` parses stapsdt notes from an ELF file's `.note.stapsdt` section. When a matching note is found (`name == "stapsdt\0"` and `type == 3`), it reads three address fields from the note descriptor: ```go // usdt.go lines 137-139 elfLocation := elfReader.ByteOrder.Uint64(desc[:wordSize]) elfBase := elfReader.ByteOrder.Uint64(desc[wordSize : 2*wordSize]) elfSemaphore := elfReader.ByteOrder.Uint64(desc[2*wordSize : 3*wordSize]) ``` For a 64-bit ELF, `wordSize = 8`, so this requires `desc` to be at least 24 bytes. However, `desc` is allocated based on the note's `DescSize` field from the ELF file: ```go desc := make([]byte, alignUp(uint64(header.DescSize), 4)) ``` A crafted ELF with `DescSize = 1` produces a 4-byte `desc` buffer. The expression `desc[:8]` then panics with: ``` panic: runtime error: slice bounds out of range [:8] with capacity 4 ``` ### Vector 2: Unbounded memory allocation (OOM) The `NameSize` and `DescSize` fields from the note header are used directly to allocate memory without any upper bound: ```go name := make([]byte, alignUp(uint64(header.NameSize), 4)) desc := make([]byte, alignUp(uint64(header.DescSize), 4)) ``` A crafted ELF with `NameSize = 0xFFFFFFFF` would attempt to allocate ~4 GiB of memory. Under cgroup memory limits (common in Kubernetes deployments), this triggers an OOM kill of the IG process. ### Vector 3: Missing panic recovery for `debug/elf` Go's `debug/elf` package is [not hardened against adversarial inputs](https://github.com/golang/go/issuesq=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+debug%2Felf+in%3Atitle) and may panic on malformed ELF headers. The cilium/ebpf library addresses this with its [`SafeELFFile` wrapper](https://github.com/cilium/ebpf/blob/main/internal/safeelf.go) that uses `recover()`, but `getUsdtInfo()` calls `elf.NewFile()` directly without any panic recovery. ## Fix The fix (3 changes in `pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`): 1. **Bounds check on descriptor size**: Validate `len(desc) >= 3*wordSize` before accessing the address fields. Reject malformed notes with an error instead of panicking. 2. **Cap allocation sizes**: Limit `NameSize` and `DescSize` to a reasonable maximum (1 MiB) before allocating memory, preventing DoS via memory exhaustion. There is no standard upper bound for ELF note fields; 1 MiB is a generous arbitrary cap — legitimate USDT notes are typically under 1 KB. 3. **Panic recovery**: Wrap `getUsdtInfo()` with `defer/recover` to catch any panics from `debug/elf` on malformed input, converting them to errors. ## Related - Go `debug/elf` known issues: https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+debug%2Felf+in%3Atitle - cilium/ebpf `SafeELFFile` wrapper: https://github.com/cilium/ebpf/blob/main/internal/safeelf.go — uses `recover()` around all `debug/elf` operations for exactly this reason.

Source published

22 Jun 2026 20:35:42 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 19:56:30 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Publisher rating · LOW

Inspektor Gadget: Unprivileged container can crash USDT note parser via crafted ELF (no shipped gadget affected) in github.com/inspektor-gadget/inspektor-gadget

Source published

25 Jun 2026 18:43:15 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 19:45:15 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.