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Auth.js: Email normalizer validates the address before Unicode normalization, allowing a homoglyph @ bypass

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68wh

Published

## Summary The default email-address normalizer used by the email/magic-link sign-in flow validates the address **before** applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character that is not an ASCII `@` (U+0040) but canonicalizes to one under NFKC/NFKD normalization (the normalization commonly applied by mail libraries and services for internationalized email). Such an address passes the normalizer's single-`@` check, but a downstream mail library that normalizes the string then sees two `@` separators and may deliver the passwordless sign-in link to a different recipient than intended. This is an instance of validating before canonicalizing. ## Am I affected? You may be affected if **all** of the following hold: - You use `next-auth` `>= 4.0.0, < 4.24.14`, or `@auth/core` `>= 0.1.0, < 0.41.3`. - You have the email / magic-link (passwordless) provider enabled. - You rely on the built-in default identifier normalizer (you have not supplied your own `normalizeIdentifier`). - Your `sendVerificationRequest` implementation uses a mail library or delivery service that applies Unicode normalization to recipient addresses (most internationalized-email/SMTPUTF8-capable senders do). You are **not** affected if you do not use the email provider, or if your normalizer/mailer rejects or canonicalizes non-ASCII addresses before they are validated. ## Impact - Account takeover: an attacker who knows a victim's email address can request a magic link that is delivered to an attacker-controlled mailbox, then use it to sign in as the victim. - No victim interaction is required to misroute the link; the attacker initiates the flow. ## Patched version The fix applies Unicode (NFKC) normalization before the address is validated, so homoglyph separators are collapsed and rejected up front. Upgrade to the first release containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with the exact patched version before publication). No application code changes are required after upgrading. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: - Supply a custom `normalizeIdentifier` on the email provider that calls `identifier.normalize("NFKC")` (and lower-cases/trims) **before** any validation, and rejects addresses that do not contain exactly one `@` after normalization. - Or reject any address whose local part or domain contains non-ASCII characters, if your user base does not require internationalized email addresses. ## Credit Reported by @kakashi-kx. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.

Source published
23 Jul 2026 14:40:15 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:51 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

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