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Terragrunt: Arbitrary File Deletion via Malicious Module Manifest

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-8394-6f8r-whxg

Published

### Summary Terragrunt is vulnerable to an arbitrary file deletion flaw when downloading external modules. If a remote module contains a maliciously crafted `.terragrunt-module-manifest` file, Terragrunt can be tricked into deleting files anywhere on the local filesystem that the Terragrunt process has access to. ### Impact This vulnerability impacts users who download and run untrusted or compromised OpenTofu/Terraform modules. The file deletion occurs during the module download and initialization phase, meaning it happens before OpenTofu or Terraform executes. In a CI/CD environment or automated runner, an attacker-controlled module could delete arbitrary files, causing denial of service in the deployment pipeline. In a local environment, it could lead to the loss of local source code or configuration files. This vulnerability is a deletion-only primitive; it does not directly allow for arbitrary code execution (RCE) or data exfiltration. ### Affected Versions - Terragrunt < `v1.0.4` ### Patches This vulnerability has been resolved in Terragrunt version `v1.0.4`. All users are strongly advised to upgrade. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately, they can mitigate this risk by: 1. Strictly auditing the source URLs of all remote modules used in their Terragrunt configurations. 2. Only consuming modules from trusted, internally vetted sources or verified registries. 3. Pinning module versions to specific, known-safe Git commit SHAs rather than mutable tags or branches. ### Technical Details Terragrunt tracks files copied into a downloaded module's working directory using a `.terragrunt-module-manifest` file. During the directory cleanup process, Terragrunt decodes the entries in this manifest and removes the listed files to prepare a fresh directory for OpenTofu/Terraform runs. Previously, Terragrunt trusted the manifest provided by the downloaded module without verifying that the paths scheduled for deletion remained within the boundaries of the module's destination directory. An attacker could forge a manifest containing directory traversal paths, causing the cleanup function to target files outside the cache. The patch introduces a secure boundary check to ensure all cleaned paths remain safely isolated inside the intended manifest folder. ## Credit Terragrunt would like to thank Francesco Sabiu ([@fsabiu](https://github.com/fsabiu)) for discovering and responsibly disclosing this vulnerability.

Source published
17 Aug 2026 16:37:34 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 14:55:57 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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Sources read 10 Nov 13:41 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 274 fully read · documentation 469/469 current