pgEdge Go LLM Library discloses provider API key fragments in error messages
Historical advisory saved 12 Nov 2026 20:18:20 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-8835-xmqj-354h
Published### Impact An unauthenticated caller could read part of the operator's configured LLM provider API key. The library's own health handler pings every configured provider using the operator's real credential and returns the resulting error text verbatim. Providers characteristically quote a partially masked form of the credential they rejected, so a failing ping published a fragment of the key. **The endpoint is unauthenticated by default.** `authorize()` returns true immediately when the consuming application sets no `Authorize` hook, so `GET /v1/health` is reachable by anyone who can reach the listening port unless the consumer opted in to authentication. **Who is affected:** any application embedding pgedge-go-llm-lib at `0.1.0` or `0.1.1` that exposes the bundled HTTP proxy without setting an `Authorize` hook. Both affected versions are released tags and resolve through the public Go module proxy. The disclosed material authenticates to a **third-party provider account** rather than to pgEdge software, which is why the severity carries Scope: Changed. Evidence at `v0.1.1`: `llm/proxy/handlers.go:296` (`handleHealth` returning `err.Error()` in `ProviderHealth.Error`), `llm/proxy/proxy.go:247` (`authorize()` defaulting to permit), and `llm/proxy/proxy.go:350` (`writeError` writing the error with no redaction). ### Patches **Fixed in `0.2.0`. Upgrade to `0.2.0` or later**, which redacts credentials from provider error messages unconditionally. The fix adds `llm/internal/redact`, with a follow-up anchoring word boundaries, and is pinned by tests in that package. **Note the version.** There is no `0.1.2` — it was never cut, and some earlier material named it in error. `0.2.0` is the first fixed release. **Upgrading does not undo a disclosure that already happened. Rotate any LLM provider credential configured on an affected version** where the proxy was reachable without an `Authorize` hook, particularly if a provider was rejecting that key at the time. ### Workarounds Set an `Authorize` hook on the proxy, which closes the unauthenticated route to the health endpoint. Restricting network access to the listening port limits who can reach it. Neither removes the underlying disclosure for a caller who does reach the endpoint.
- Source published
- 12 Nov 2026 19:32:36 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Nov 2026 19:45:03 UTC
- Saved here
- 12 Nov 2026 20:18:20 UTC
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- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE