Malicious code in daisypick (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-15835
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (a9bd46c99a0d58d9ded0faca080e42efa9015c9bd213c46292e82644117d53ae) The package presents itself as a Tailwind CSS color/service-worker helper, but the `daisypick/plugin` export reads a URL from `node_modules/.bin/manifest.json`, downloads a JavaScript body over the network via `fetchScript`, deletes the manifest file after reading it, and passes the downloaded code to `resolveDelegate`. `resolveDelegate` reconstructs the string `constructor` at runtime by shuffling the seed strings `METHOD_SEED = "gbcweftcoqstauctorhijklmnopdrsruvnxy"` and `TOKEN_SEED` with `colorToHex`, indexes `resolver[methodName]` to obtain the `Function` constructor, and invokes the resulting function inside `withModuleContext`, executing the fetched code in the Node process with `require`, `module`, and `__filename` bound in. The fetched URL is unpinned and unverified, and the manifest is unlinked after use. Any developer adding `daisypick/plugin` to a Tailwind config therefore causes arbitrary remote JavaScript to run in-process on the build machine on every Tailwind build, with the Function-constructor lookup deliberately hidden behind color-utility naming to evade static inspection. ## Source: ghsa-malware (20c367b0508b0c8f2cd7476d0f5f44758ee2fc0fab0ccddd1dd6edc80f655702) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 2 Sep 2026 11:18:04 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Sep 2026 06:45:07 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.