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Budibase: Anonymous NoSQL operator injection via published-app query templates

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-54350

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.12.

Source published
26 Jun 2026 20:44:00 UTC
Source modified
30 Jun 2026 19:31:58 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-39914

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.12.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 26, 2026, 8:44:00 PM

dateUpdated: Jun 30, 2026, 7:31:58 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2041: Budibase: Schwachstelle ermöglicht SQL-Injection

CVE-2026-54350

Source published
Jun 26, 2026, 8:44:00 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jun 30, 2026, 7:31:58 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
21 Nov 2026 17:18:37 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-54350

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId (packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63) accepts the call with no session, only an x-budibase-app-id header that is public from the published-app URL. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.12.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Modified

Weakness classifications: CWE-89 · CWE-943

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-06-26T21:16:35.040

lastModified: 2026-06-30T20:17:30.883

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:budibase:budibase:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
26 Jun 2026 21:16:35 UTC
Source modified
30 Jun 2026 20:17:30 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 10.0 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-8qv3-p479-cj62

Published

## Summary `enrichContext` at `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138` substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then `JSON.parse`s the result. The validator `validateQueryInputs` at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71` rejects only Handlebars markers (`{{`, `}}`) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (`"`, `\`, `}`). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo `find`, the parsed filter passes directly to `collection.find()` (`packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510`). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's `{name: "..."}` with `{name: {$exists: true}}` and returns every document. The same primitive against an `updateMany` query (`mongodb.ts:577-585`) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled `$set` body runs against every matched document. The `authorized` middleware at `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148` short-circuits when the query's role is `PUBLIC`. CSRF is not enforced on this path. `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63`) accepts the call with no session, only an `x-budibase-app-id` header that is public from the published-app URL. Result: an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. ## Affected `Budibase/budibase` server, `@budibase/server` package, `<= 3.39.0` (HEAD `feab995`, released 2026-05-20). Reachable on any deployment where a workspace builder has set the role of a non-SQL query (MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST with `bodyType=json`) to `PUBLIC` and published the app. This is the canonical low-code public-form use case. SQL datasources (Postgres, MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle, MariaDB) route through `interpolateSQL` and are not affected. ## Root cause `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138`: `processStringSync(fields[key], parameters, {noEscaping: true, noHelpers: true})` writes the raw parameter value into the JSON-body string with no JSON-string escape; the followup `JSON.parse(enrichedQuery.json || enrichedQuery.customData || enrichedQuery.requestBody)` lifts the substituted text into the integration filter object. `packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71`: `validateQueryInputs` only rejects values where `findHBSBlocks(value).length !== 0` (Handlebars markers) and ignores JSON metacharacters. `packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510`: `collection.find(json)` receives the user-controlled filter object directly with no key prefix or operator allow-list. `packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:577-585`: `collection.updateMany(json.filter, json.update, json.options)` accepts the templated filter without verifying that the substituted filter still matches the builder's intent. `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148`: `if (resourceRoles.includes(roles.BUILTIN_ROLE_IDS.PUBLIC)) return next()` skips both authentication and CSRF. `packages/server/src/integrations/queries/sql.ts:29-122`: `interpolateSQL` rewrites every `{{ binding }}` to a positional bind placeholder (`$N` or `?`). The SQL leg is bind-parameterised; the JSON leg is not. ## Reproduction `budibase/budibase:latest` (`v3.39.0`) Docker single-container, default config. Builder logs in once, creates a MongoDB datasource, creates a query `GetUserByName` with body `{ "name": "{{ name }}" }`, sets the query role to `PUBLIC`, and publishes the app. 1. Anonymous client sends the inject payload to the read query. ```http POST /api/v2/queries/<read-queryId> HTTP/1.1 Host: <budibase-host> x-budibase-app-id: <published-appId> Content-Type: application/json {"parameters":{"name":"x\",\"name\":{\"$exists\":true},\"$comment\":\"audit"}} ``` ```json {"data":[ {"_id":"...","name":"alice","secret":"alice-secret-flag"}, {"_id":"...","name":"bob","secret":"bob-secret-flag"}, {"_id":"...","name":"admin","role":"admin","secret":"ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG"} ]} ``` 2. Builder publishes a second query `TouchUser` (verb `update`, action `updateMany`, body `{ "filter": { "name": "{{ name }}" }, "update": { "$set": { "touched": true } } }`, role `PUBLIC`). Anonymous client sends the same inject pattern. ```http POST /api/v2/queries/<updateMany-queryId> HTTP/1.1 Host: <budibase-host> x-budibase-app-id: <published-appId> Content-Type: application/json {"parameters":{"name":"x\",\"name\":{\"$exists\":true},\"$comment\":\"esc"}} ``` ```json {"data":[{"acknowledged":true,"matchedCount":3,"modifiedCount":3,"upsertedId":null,"upsertedCount":0}]} ``` Live-verified: against Budibase v3.39.0 on 2026-05-20, anonymous read returned every document including `ADMIN-SUPER-SECRET-FLAG`; anonymous `updateMany` reported `matchedCount: 3, modifiedCount: 3` against a 3-document collection where the builder's filter intended `name = "x"`. ## Impact - Anonymous read of every document in any backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection reachable through a `PUBLIC` query, including columns the published query was not designed to return (`password_hash`, `secret`, `api_token`, `mfa_secret`). - Anonymous modification of every document of that collection where the builder has published a `PUBLIC` `update`, `delete`, or `aggregate` query, beyond the builder's intended single-document scope. - One HTTP request, no session, no CSRF, no user interaction. ## Credit Jan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://turingpoint.de) ([email protected]).

Source published
23 Jun 2026 17:43:10 UTC
Source modified
12 Aug 2026 19:00:08 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 22 Nov 04:54 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current