New API: Integer overflow in quota billing yields negative charges (self-crediting)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to 1.0.0-rc.18, user-controlled image n, video seconds and duration, max_tokens, max_completion_tokens, maxOutputTokens, audio duration, and billing-expression quantities can overflow conversions in common/quota_math.go and related settlement paths, allowing a low-privileged account with positive balance or an active subscription to turn a negative charge into account credit and potentially drain upstream funds. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-rc.18.

Source published

17 Aug 2026 16:11:28 UTC

Source modified

17 Aug 2026 18:59:30 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to 1.0.0-rc.18, user-controlled image n, video seconds and duration, max_tokens, max_completion_tokens, maxOutputTokens, audio duration, and billing-expression quantities can overflow conversions in common/quota_math.go and related settlement paths, allowing a low-privileged account with positive balance or an active subscription to turn a negative charge into account credit and potentially drain upstream funds. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-rc.18.

Source published

17 Aug 2026 16:17:44 UTC

Source modified

24 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 15:18:57 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

## Summary Multiple billing paths multiplied **user-controlled quantity parameters** into the quota calculation without an upper bound or overflow-safe integer conversion. A crafted extreme value (e.g. image `n = 18446744073686646784`, a wrapped-negative accepted by a `*uint` field) makes conversions like `int(float64(quota) * n)` wrap past the int64/int32 range into a large **negative** quota. The negative quota takes effect at **settlement** (not at pre-consume), where it is equivalent to crediting the user's balance — turning a small positive balance into an enormous one. ## Timeline（UTC+8） This vulnerability was confirmed **exploited in the wild**. Response timeline (UTC+8): - **2026-07-06 23:00** — Community user @lihui12388 reported that their deployment had been exploited via this vulnerability (large negative consumption entries in logs and abnormally inflated balances). We confirmed in-the-wild exploitation and started an emergency response immediately. - **2026-07-07 01:17** — Emergency fix released as [`v1.0.0-rc.18`](https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/releases/tag/v1.0.0-rc.18), roughly 2 hours after the report. - **2026-07-07 (next day)** — Given the confirmed active exploitation, we publicly disclosed the vulnerability and the fixed version to the community the following day so that all operators could upgrade and audit promptly. - **2026-07-07 13:19** — [`v1.0.0-rc.19`](https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/releases/tag/v1.0.0-rc.19) released with additional observability (quota-saturation warning logs) to help operators audit and monitor abuse. ## Preconditions This is **not** a zero-balance freebie. The attacker must hold an account whose wallet balance is `> 0` and at least covers the request's normal (un-inflated) pre-consume amount — the pre-consume gate rejects `userQuota <= 0` and insufficient balance with HTTP 403. Quantity multipliers (`n`, duration, ...) are not applied at pre-consume; the overflow only manifests at settlement, flipping the charge negative and crediting the balance. **Severity escalates** when the deployment enables any feature that grants free starting balance, because the required positive balance is then obtained at zero cost and at scale: check-in rewards (`CheckinSetting.Enabled`), invite rebates (`QuotaForInviter` / `QuotaForInvitee`), or new-user quota gifts (`QuotaForNewUser`). With self-registration on by default and any of these enabled, an attacker can register (or mass-register) to obtain seed balance for free, then inflate it via a single crafted request — effectively unauthenticated exploitation. ## Impact A low-privilege user with a positive balance can massively inflate their own balance with a single crafted request (negative settlement = credit), violating billing integrity. Sustained abuse can drain the operator's prepaid upstream funds and render billing/service unavailable. **Exploitation in the wild has been confirmed** (see Timeline above). ## Root cause Single root cause: user-controlled multipliers lacked upper-bound validation before entering quota math, and the float/decimal-to-int conversions lacked saturation. Because `*uint` accepts huge positive values (a wrapped negative), a `>= 0` check is insufficient — an explicit upper bound is required. ## Fix Fixed via defense-in-depth: (1) upper-bound validation at request ingress (400 on violation), (2) local clamping of the same quantities on validation-bypass paths (passthrough/metadata/multipart), and (3) centralized saturating conversions in `common/quota_math.go` that clamp to int32 and never wrap. Saturation events are additionally audited on the related consume/task log under `admin_info.quota_saturation` (admin-only) and via request-correlated backend warnings.

Source published

17 Aug 2026 16:36:13 UTC

Source modified

18 Aug 2026 15:10:55 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

New API: Integer overflow in quota billing yields negative charges (self-crediting) in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

Source published

18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC

Source modified

18 Aug 2026 15:00:25 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.