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Hono has Body Limit Middleware Bypass

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

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cve-program · CVE-2025-59139

Published

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.

Source published
12 Sep 2025 13:03:05 UTC
Source modified
12 Sep 2025 13:45:58 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2025-29042

Published

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 12, 2025, 1:03:05 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 12, 2025, 1:45:58 PM

Source published
Sep 12, 2025, 1:03:05 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 12, 2025, 1:45:58 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 05:43:08 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

nvd · CVE-2025-59139

Published

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. In versions prior to 4.9.7, a flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-770

Original publisher date fields

published: 2025-09-12T14:15:41.940

lastModified: 2026-06-17T09:45:36.547

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:hono:hono:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
12 Sep 2025 14:15:41 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 09:45:36 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 03:17:18 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

osv · GHSA-92vj-g62v-jqhh

Published

### Summary A flaw in the `bodyLimit` middleware could allow bypassing the configured request body size limit when conflicting HTTP headers were present. ### Details The middleware previously prioritized the `Content-Length` header even when a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header was also included. According to the HTTP specification, `Content-Length` must be ignored in such cases. This discrepancy could allow oversized request bodies to bypass the configured limit. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies may reject such malformed requests with `400 Bad Request`, so the practical impact depends on the runtime and deployment environment. ### Impact If body size limits are used as a safeguard against large or malicious requests, this flaw could allow attackers to send oversized request bodies. The primary risk is denial of service (DoS) due to excessive memory or CPU consumption when handling very large requests. ### Resolution The implementation has been updated to align with the HTTP specification, ensuring that `Transfer-Encoding` takes precedence over `Content-Length`. The issue is fixed in Hono v4.9.7, and all users should upgrade immediately.

Source published
12 Sep 2025 21:12:20 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:28 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

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Sources read 16 Nov 11:47 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current