Malicious code in @dreamguyxeon/baileyx (npm)

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

npm/@dreamguyxeon/baileyx is a Baileys WhatsApp Web API fork with the same undisclosed remote-controlled consentless newsletter auto-follow as related DGXeon packages. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js, after session setup it waits 120 seconds, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and silently FOLLOWs listed newsletter JIDs. Trigger is runtime (makeNewsletterSocket), not install. It also fetches Baileys version metadata from DGXeon13/dgxeon-soket and aliases libsignal to npm:@dgxeon13/[email protected] (a separate package that patches @whiskeysockets/baileys). Independently corroborated by LPM Firewall's public malicious report for 2.0.0. Related OSV entries: dgxeon-baileys (MAL-2026-2252), baileys-dgxeon (MAL-2025-806). Tarball sha256 for 5.0.0: 0dffc5f0c8fd53b520c26de8788e6eafb1d939070a698e39f9f9853f42e6f7db. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c1b873d1c35283cbabd9bc82c8bffa55d3151abec85a75522ed8565c93d0546a) This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that contains an undocumented runtime hijack of the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp account. In lib/Socket/newsletter.js (lines 102-122), when the consumer creates a WhatsApp socket — the package's main advertised function — a 120-second setTimeout fires, fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json, and for each newsletter ID in that list issues a QueryIds.FOLLOW request under the user's authenticated session. The list is hosted on a mutable `main` branch under the package author's GitHub account, so the author can rotate the targeted channels at any time post-publication without republishing the package. The behavior is not mentioned in the README and is not gated by any user prompt or configuration. The main entrypoint lib/index.js is additionally wrapped in a custom base91 string-table decoder with anti-debugger `debugger` statements and `eval("this")`, concealing the bootstrap edges from casual review. The package also aliases the security-critical `libsignal` dependency to the same author's scope (`npm:@dreamguyxeon/[email protected]`), placing crypto primitives under the same trust boundary as the silent-relay code. Installer harm: any consumer who connects this fork to their WhatsApp account has their identity used to silently follow channels of the author's choosing, with the target list mutable indefinitely. ## Source: ghsa-malware (754cbf8aed43f593956c581a15ddfba2be14d4c0ae555a65c3955916f6412377) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source published

10 Aug 2026 22:30:00 UTC

Source modified

21 Oct 2026 04:45:04 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

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