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xml-crypto Vulnerable to XML Signature Verification Bypass via Multiple SignedInfo References

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-9p8x-f768-wp2g

Published

# Impact An attacker may be able to exploit this vulnerability to bypass authentication or authorization mechanisms in systems that rely on xml-crypto for verifying signed XML documents. The vulnerability allows an attacker to modify a valid signed XML message in a way that still passes signature verification checks. For example, it could be used to alter critical identity or access control attributes, enabling an attacker with a valid account to escalate privileges or impersonate another user. # Patches All versions <= 6.0.0 are affected. Please upgrade to version 6.0.1. If you are still using v2.x or v3.x please upgrade to the associated patch version. # Indicators of Compromise When logging XML payloads, check for the following indicators. If the payload includes encrypted elements, ensure you analyze the decrypted version for a complete assessment. (If encryption is not used, analyze the original XML document directly). This applies to various XML-based authentication and authorization flows, such as SAML Response payloads. ### Multiple SignedInfo Nodes There should not be more than one SignedInfo node inside a Signature. If you find multiple SignedInfo nodes, it could indicate an attack. ```xml <Signature> <SomeNode> <SignedInfo> <Reference URI="somefakereference"> <DigestValue>forgeddigestvalue</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> </SomeNode> <SignedInfo> <Reference URI="realsignedreference"> <DigestValue>realdigestvalue</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo> </SignedInfo> </Signature> ``` ### Code to test Pass in the decrypted version of the document ```js decryptedDocument = ... // yours to implement // This check is per-Signature node, not per-document const signedInfoNodes = xpath.select(".//*[local-name(.)='SignedInfo']", signatureNode); if (signedInfoNodes.length === 0) { // Not necessarily a compromise, but invalid. Should contain exactly one SignedInfo node // Yours to implement } if (signedInfoNodes.length > 1) { // Compromise detected, yours to implement } ```

Source published
14 Mar 2025 17:14:23 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:49:48 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

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