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Tinyauth has OAuth account confusion via shared mutable state on singleton service instances

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-33544

Published

Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to version 5.0.5, all three OAuth service implementations (GenericOAuthService, GithubOAuthService, GoogleOAuthService) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between VerifyCode() and Userinfo() causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.5.

Source published
2 Apr 2026 15:00:38 UTC
Source modified
3 Apr 2026 18:23:22 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-18254

Published

Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to version 5.0.5, all three OAuth service implementations (GenericOAuthService, GithubOAuthService, GoogleOAuthService) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between VerifyCode() and Userinfo() causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.5.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Apr 2, 2026, 3:00:38 PM

dateUpdated: Apr 3, 2026, 6:23:22 PM

Source published
Apr 2, 2026, 3:00:38 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Apr 3, 2026, 6:23:22 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
1 Nov 2026 05:14:34 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-33544

Published

Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to version 5.0.5, all three OAuth service implementations (GenericOAuthService, GithubOAuthService, GoogleOAuthService) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between VerifyCode() and Userinfo() causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.5.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-362

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-04-02T15:16:39.553

lastModified: 2026-10-26T22:10:00.163

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:tinyauth:tinyauth:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

Source published
2 Apr 2026 15:16:39 UTC
Source modified
26 Oct 2026 22:10:00 UTC
Observed here
27 Oct 2026 09:02:55 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-9q5m-jfc4-wc92

Published

### Summary All three OAuth service implementations (`GenericOAuthService`, `GithubOAuthService`, `GoogleOAuthService`) store PKCE verifiers and access tokens as mutable struct fields on singleton instances shared across all concurrent requests. When two users initiate OAuth login for the same provider concurrently, a race condition between `VerifyCode()` and `Userinfo()` causes one user to receive a session with the other user's identity. ### Details The [`OAuthBrokerService.GetService()`](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/oauth_broker_service.go#L70-L72) returns a single shared instance per provider for every request. The OAuth flow stores intermediate state as struct fields on this singleton: **Token storage** — [`generic_oauth_service.go` line 96](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/generic_oauth_service.go#L96): ```go generic.token = token // Shared mutable field on singleton ``` **Verifier storage** — [`generic_oauth_service.go` line 81](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/generic_oauth_service.go#L81): ```go generic.verifier = verifier // Shared mutable field on singleton ``` In the callback handler [`oauth_controller.go` lines 136–143](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/controller/oauth_controller.go#L136-L143), the code calls: ```go err = service.VerifyCode(code) // line 136 — stores token on singleton // ... race window ... user, err := controller.broker.GetUser(req.Provider) // line 143 — reads token from singleton ``` Between these two calls, a concurrent request's `VerifyCode()` can overwrite the `token` field, causing `GetUser()` → `Userinfo()` to fetch the **wrong user's** identity claims. The same pattern exists in all three implementations: - [`github_oauth_service.go` lines 34–39, 77, 86–99](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/github_oauth_service.go#L34-L39) - [`google_oauth_service.go` lines 22–27, 65, 73–87](https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/blob/592b7ded24959013f8af63ab9930254c752c8c8e/internal/service/google_oauth_service.go#L22-L27) ### PoC **Race scenario** (two concurrent OAuth callbacks): 1. User A and User B both click "Login with GitHub" on the same tinyauth instance 2. Both are redirected to GitHub, authorize, and GitHub redirects both back with authorization codes 3. Both callbacks arrive at tinyauth nearly simultaneously: ``` Timeline: t0: Request A → service.VerifyCode(codeA) → singleton.token = tokenA t1: Request B → service.VerifyCode(codeB) → singleton.token = tokenB (overwrites tokenA) t2: Request A → broker.GetUser("github") → Userinfo() reads singleton.token = tokenB t3: Request A receives User B's identity (email, name, groups) ``` User A now has a tinyauth session with User B's email, gaining access to all resources User B is authorized for via tinyauth's ACL. **PKCE verifier DoS variant**: Even with PKCE, concurrent `oauthURLHandler` calls overwrite the `verifier` field, causing `VerifyCode()` to send the wrong verifier to the OAuth provider, which rejects the exchange. **Static verification**: Run Go's race detector on a test that calls `VerifyCode` and `Userinfo` concurrently on the same service instance — the `-race` flag will flag data races on the `token` and `verifier` fields. **Go race detector confirmation**: Running a concurrent test with `go test -race` on the singleton service detects **4 data races** on the `token` and `verifier` fields. Without the race detector, measured token overwrite rate is 99.9% (9,985/10,000 iterations). **Test environment**: tinyauth v5.0.4, commit `592b7ded`, Go race detector + source code analysis ### Impact An attacker who times their OAuth callback to race with a victim's callback can obtain a tinyauth session with the victim's identity. This grants unauthorized access to all resources the victim is permitted to access through tinyauth's ACL system. The probability of collision increases with concurrent OAuth traffic. The PKCE verifier overwrite additionally causes a denial-of-service: concurrent OAuth logins for the same provider reliably fail. ### Suggested Fix Pass verifier and token through method parameters or return values instead of storing them on the singleton: ```go func (generic *GenericOAuthService) VerifyCode(code string, verifier string) (*oauth2.Token, error) { return generic.config.Exchange(generic.context, code, oauth2.VerifierOption(verifier)) } func (generic *GenericOAuthService) Userinfo(token *oauth2.Token) (config.Claims, error) { client := generic.config.Client(generic.context, token) // ... } ``` Store the PKCE verifier in the session/cookie associated with the OAuth `state` parameter, not on the service struct.

Source published
1 Apr 2026 19:52:04 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 19:56:22 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5296

Published

Tinyauth has OAuth account confusion via shared mutable state on singleton service instances in github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth

Source published
25 Jun 2026 18:43:19 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 19:45:27 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 1 Nov 14:06 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 271 fully read · documentation 469/469 current