n8n: Authenticated SSRF via Dynamic Node Parameters Endpoints Allows Internal Network Access

## Impact Endpoints in `/rest/dynamic-node-parameters/` lacked authorization scopes, making it reachable by any authenticated user with no workflow creation or execution required. By supplying an absolute URL in the routing configuration, a caller could override the node type's declared baseURL, defeating the restriction meant to confine requests to the node's own upstream service. With SSRF protection disabled by default (`N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false`), this let an authenticated user make the n8n server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal targets. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.64, 2.29.8, and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only. - Set `N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true` to enable SSRF filtering for private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. - Restrict network egress from the n8n host to limit reachable internal services. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Source published

22 Jul 2026 22:01:10 UTC

Source modified

22 Jul 2026 22:26:48 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

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