Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service
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cve-program · CVE-2026-77561
PublishedTinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.
- Source published
- 21 Sep 2026 16:48:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 22:23:12 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
euvd · EUVD-2026-84015
PublishedTinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.
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datePublished: Sep 21, 2026, 4:48:21 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 24, 2026, 10:23:12 PM
- Source published
- Sep 21, 2026, 4:48:21 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 24, 2026, 10:23:12 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 17:51:44 UTC
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- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
nvd · CVE-2026-77561
PublishedTinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-307
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-21T17:18:52.943
lastModified: 2026-09-24T23:19:02.063
- Source published
- 21 Sep 2026 17:18:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 23:19:02 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
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- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
osv · GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh
Published### Summary Tinyauth's login rate-limit bookkeeping can enter a global lockdown mode when its in-memory login-attempt map reaches 256 distinct identifiers. Because unauthenticated `POST /api/user/login` requests for unknown usernames are recorded in this same map, a remote unauthenticated attacker can submit 257 unique bogus usernames and cause valid credentials for unrelated users to be treated as locked until `auth.loginTimeout` expires. This was confirmed against the stable `v5.0.7` release. With default configuration, `auth.loginTimeout` is 300 seconds and `auth.loginMaxRetries` is 3, so the denial lasts about 5 minutes and can be repeated. ### Details In stable `v5.0.7`, the login endpoint is registered at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:45` and accepts unauthenticated JSON credentials in `loginHandler` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:50`. Before validating credentials, it calls `controller.auth.IsAccountLocked(req.Username)` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:65`. When a username does not exist, the login handler records a failed login attempt for the attacker-controlled username with `controller.auth.RecordLoginAttempt(req.Username, false)` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:83`. Invalid passwords for existing users do the same at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:94`. The rate-limit map has a hard cap of 256 records at `internal/service/auth_service.go:29`. `RecordLoginAttempt` checks `len(auth.loginAttempts) >= MaxLoginAttemptRecords` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:261` and, once the cap is reached, launches `auth.lockdownMode()` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:265` instead of evicting old identifiers or rejecting only the new identifier. `lockdownMode` sets a global `auth.lockdown` value with `Active: true` and `ActiveUntil: now + auth.config.LoginTimeout` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:790-804`. `IsAccountLocked` checks this global lockdown before looking up the requested identifier at `internal/service/auth_service.go:227-234`, so every username is treated as locked while the global lockdown is active. The default configuration enables this path with `LoginTimeout: 300` and `LoginMaxRetries: 3` at `internal/config/config.go:23-24`. Source-to-sink path: ```text Unauthenticated POST /api/user/login JSON username -> loginHandler binds LoginRequest -> unknown username path records RecordLoginAttempt(attacker-chosen username, false) -> 257 unique identifiers fill loginAttempts beyond MaxLoginAttemptRecords -> RecordLoginAttempt starts lockdownMode() -> lockdownMode sets global auth.lockdown.Active = true -> IsAccountLocked returns locked for unrelated valid users -> login endpoint returns HTTP 429 for valid credentials until loginTimeout expires ``` Candidate score: 13/14. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 1, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction feasibility 2. ### PoC This PoC is local and non-destructive. It was tested against stable tag `v5.0.7`. It proves that 257 distinct unknown-user identifiers trigger global lockdown for an unrelated valid user, while that user's password still verifies successfully. 1. Check out stable `v5.0.7`. 2. Create `internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go`: ```go package service import ( "fmt" "testing" "time" "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config" "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/utils/tlog" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown(t *testing.T) { tlog.NewTestLogger().Init() authServiceCfg := AuthServiceConfig{ Users: []config.User{{ Username: "testuser", Password: "$2a$10$ZwVYQH07JX2zq7Fjkt3gU.BjwvvwPeli4OqOno04RQIv0P7usBrXa", // password }}, LoginTimeout: 2, LoginMaxRetries: 3, } authService := NewAuthService(authServiceCfg, &DockerService{}, &LdapService{}, nil, nil) t.Cleanup(authService.ClearRateLimitsTestingOnly) require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{ Username: "testuser", Type: "local", }, "password")) for i := 0; i <= MaxLoginAttemptRecords; i++ { authService.RecordLoginAttempt(fmt.Sprintf("attacker-%03d", i), false) } require.Eventually(t, func() bool { locked, _ := authService.IsAccountLocked("testuser") return locked }, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond) locked, remaining := authService.IsAccountLocked("testuser") require.True(t, locked) require.GreaterOrEqual(t, remaining, 0) require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{ Username: "testuser", Type: "local", }, "password")) t.Logf("proof on v5.0.7: %d distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked", MaxLoginAttemptRecords+1) } ``` 3. Run: ```bash go test ./internal/service -run 'TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown' -count=1 -v ``` Observed output from this environment: ```text === RUN TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown auth_service.go:798: Multiple login attempts detected, possibly DDOS attack. Activating temporary lockdown. login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go:42: proof on v5.0.7: 257 distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked --- PASS: TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown (0.10s) PASS ok github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/service 0.111s ``` 4. Cleanup: ```bash rm internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go ``` ### Impact A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach Tinyauth's login endpoint can temporarily deny login for unrelated valid users by sending a small number of login attempts using unique nonexistent usernames. With default configuration, the global lockdown lasts 300 seconds. The attack does not invalidate existing sessions, but users who need to log in during the lockdown window receive rate-limit responses even when providing valid credentials. This affects availability of local login and any flow that depends on the same account-lock check. The issue is especially relevant for internet-exposed Tinyauth deployments where `/api/user/login` is reachable. Suggested remediation: do not enter global lockdown because of attacker-controlled unknown usernames. Use bounded LRU eviction for old login-attempt records instead of global lockout; consider rate limiting by client IP plus normalized username; avoid counting unlimited nonexistent usernames toward a global security state. If a global safety mode is desired, require stronger signals such as source-based thresholds rather than only distinct username count.
- Source published
- 22 Sep 2026 20:37:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Oct 2026 20:56:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6564
PublishedTinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service in github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth
- Source published
- 1 Oct 2026 20:23:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Oct 2026 20:45:14 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
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- OSV · upstream source license applies
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