Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-c38w-74pg-36hr
Published### Impact Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key. ### Patches No patch is yet available, however work is underway to migrate to a fully constant-time implementation. ### Workarounds The only currently available workaround is to avoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers are able to observe timing information, e.g. local use on a non-compromised computer is fine. ### References This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks. - https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html - https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ - https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19
- Source published
- 28 Nov 2023 23:28:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:49:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
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- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE