Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

rustix's `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm

Published

### Summary When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. ### Details #### Discovery The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See [this post](https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284#issuecomment-1754321993) and the [Discord thread](https://discord.com/channels/273534239310479360/1161137828395237556) for details. #### Diagnosis This issue is caused by the combination of two independent bugs: 1. Stuck iterator - The `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator can fail to halt after encountering an IO error, causing the caller to be stuck in an infinite loop. 2. Memory over-allocation - `Dir::read_more` incorrectly grows the read buffer unconditionally each time it is called, regardless of necessity. Since `<Dir as Iterator>::next` calls `Dir::read`, which in turn calls `Dir::read_more`, this means an IO error encountered during reading a directory can lead to rapid and unbounded growth of memory use. ### PoC ```rust fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> { // create a directory, get a FD to it, then unlink the directory but keep the FD std::fs::create_dir("tmp_dir")?; let dir_fd = rustix::fs::openat( rustix::fs::CWD, rustix::cstr!("tmp_dir"), rustix::fs::OFlags::RDONLY | rustix::fs::OFlags::CLOEXEC, rustix::fs::Mode::empty(), )?; std::fs::remove_dir("tmp_dir")?; // iterator gets stuck in infinite loop and memory explodes rustix::fs::Dir::read_from(dir_fd)? // the iterator keeps returning `Some(Err(_))`, but never halts by returning `None` // therefore if the implementation ignores the error (or otherwise continues // after seeing the error instead of breaking), the loop will not halt .filter_map(|dirent_maybe_error| dirent_maybe_error.ok()) .for_each(|dirent| { // your happy path println!("{dirent:?}"); }); Ok(()) } ``` ### Impact If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the `Dir` iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion. As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. `/proc`, `/sys`) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using `rustix::fs::Dir` directly or indirectly (e.g. with the `procfs` crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors. An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service.

Source published
18 Oct 2023 18:27:47 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:03 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 03:46 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current