Effect: Cookie attribute injection via domain, path, and name fields in @effect/platform makeCookie()
Historical advisory saved 10 Nov 2026 16:21:51 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-chp3-j5qr-2vfr
Published### Impact The `name`, `domain`, and `path` fields of `makeCookie()` were validated with a regex that allows `;`, the attribute separator in `Set-Cookie` headers. Because `serializeCookie()` writes those fields verbatim, a caller who passes untrusted input into any of them can append arbitrary attributes to the header. For example, a `domain` of `"legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld"` serializes to `session=token; Domain=legit.com; Domain=.parent.tld`. RFC 6265 §5.3 takes the last occurrence, so the injected domain wins and the cookie widens to the parent domain. The same trick sets `SameSite=None` or `Max-Age` when the caller has not set those options itself. The `value` field is unaffected: it passes through `encodeURIComponent`, which encodes `;`. CR and LF are rejected by the existing regex, so header splitting is not possible. ### Patches Fixed in #6763 (v4) and #6765 (v3): the shared regex is split into per-field validators that reject `;`, and `serializeCookie()` now validates before writing the header. ### Workarounds Do not pass user input into `name`, `domain`, or `path`; set them from application constants.
- Source published
- 10 Nov 2026 15:57:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Nov 2026 16:15:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 10 Nov 2026 16:21:51 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE