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Budibase: Unvalidated VectorDB Host Parameter Enables SSRF

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-cv96-5348-p5p8

Published

### Summary The VectorDB configuration endpoint in Budibase accepts a host parameter that undergoes no validation against internal IP ranges, reserved hostnames, or URL schemes. Any authenticated user with builder-level access can supply an arbitrary host value such as `169.254.169.254` or localhost, causing the server to initiate outbound TCP connections to internal network addresses or cloud metadata endpoints on their behalf. ### Details The validator responsible for VectorDB creation and updates defines the host field as `Joi.string().required()`, which enforces only that the value is a non-empty string. No allowlist of external hostnames, no blocklist of RFC 1918 or link-local ranges, and no scheme validation are applied before the value is forwarded to the database SDK for connection establishment. When a VectorDB entry is created or updated, the SDK uses the supplied host directly to open a TCP connection. Because the connection attempt originates from the Budibase server process, it traverses internal network boundaries that would otherwise be inaccessible to the attacker. Differences in connection timing and error messages between reachable and unreachable hosts allow an attacker to enumerate internal services and determine whether specific addresses are live. In cloud environments, the AWS EC2 metadata service at `169.254.169.254`, the GCP metadata server at `metadata.google.internal`, and equivalent endpoints for other providers are all reachable this way. Builder access is a realistic precondition in multi-tenant or team deployments, as the builder role is intended to allow application development without granting administrative privileges over the underlying infrastructure. ### PoC ```python import requests import time BASE_URL = "https://TARGET_BUDIBASE_INSTANCE" SESSION = requests.Session() login_resp = SESSION.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/global/auth/default/login", json={ "username": "[email protected]", "password": "builderpassword" }) token = login_resp.cookies.get("budibase:auth") or login_resp.json().get("token") SESSION.headers.update({"Cookie": f"budibase:auth={token}"}) targets = [ ("169.254.169.254", 80), ("localhost", 5432), ("10.0.0.1", 22), ] for host, port in targets: start = time.time() resp = SESSION.post(f"{BASE_URL}/api/ai/vectordb", json={ "name": f"probe_{host.replace('.', '_')}_{port}", "provider": "pgvector", "host": host, "port": port, "database": "db" }) elapsed = time.time() - start print(f"host={host} port={port} status={resp.status_code} time={elapsed:.2f}s body={resp.text[:200]}") ``` ### Impact An attacker with builder access can use the Budibase server as a proxy to probe internal network topology, determine which hosts and ports are reachable from the server, and potentially interact with unauthenticated internal services including cloud instance metadata endpoints. In environments where cloud metadata endpoints expose credentials or instance identity documents, successful retrieval of metadata could lead to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the cloud environment. The attack requires no interaction beyond a single authenticated API request per probe target.

Source published
12 Jun 2026 18:27:45 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:51:08 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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