exiftool-vendored: Argument injection via newline characters in tag names

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

exiftool-vendored provides cross-platform Node.js access to ExifTool. Prior to 35.19.0, exiftool-vendored starts ExifTool in -stay_open True -@ - mode, where arguments are read from stdin one per line. In affected versions, several caller-supplied strings were interpolated into ExifTool arguments without rejecting line delimiters. A newline or carriage return inside one of those strings could split a single intended argument into multiple ExifTool arguments, allowing argument injection. The fix also rejects NUL bytes as unsafe control characters. Applications that pass attacker-controlled strings to affected APIs may allow an attacker to make ExifTool read files accessible to the ExifTool process, or write output to attacker-chosen file system paths accessible to that process. No remote code execution has been demonstrated. This vulnerability is fixed in 35.19.0.

Source published

11 May 2026 20:59:14 UTC

Source modified

12 May 2026 12:54:40 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

exiftool-vendored provides cross-platform Node.js access to ExifTool. Prior to 35.19.0, exiftool-vendored starts ExifTool in -stay_open True -@ - mode, where arguments are read from stdin one per line. In affected versions, several caller-supplied strings were interpolated into ExifTool arguments without rejecting line delimiters. A newline or carriage return inside one of those strings could split a single intended argument into multiple ExifTool arguments, allowing argument injection. The fix also rejects NUL bytes as unsafe control characters. Applications that pass attacker-controlled strings to affected APIs may allow an attacker to make ExifTool read files accessible to the ExifTool process, or write output to attacker-chosen file system paths accessible to that process. No remote code execution has been demonstrated. This vulnerability is fixed in 35.19.0.

Source published

May 11, 2026, 8:59:14 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

May 12, 2026, 12:54:40 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 09:37:13 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

exiftool-vendored provides cross-platform Node.js access to ExifTool. Prior to 35.19.0, exiftool-vendored starts ExifTool in -stay_open True -@ - mode, where arguments are read from stdin one per line. In affected versions, several caller-supplied strings were interpolated into ExifTool arguments without rejecting line delimiters. A newline or carriage return inside one of those strings could split a single intended argument into multiple ExifTool arguments, allowing argument injection. The fix also rejects NUL bytes as unsafe control characters. Applications that pass attacker-controlled strings to affected APIs may allow an attacker to make ExifTool read files accessible to the ExifTool process, or write output to attacker-chosen file system paths accessible to that process. No remote code execution has been demonstrated. This vulnerability is fixed in 35.19.0.

Source published

11 May 2026 22:22:14 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 18:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:04 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

### Impact `exiftool-vendored` starts ExifTool in `-stay_open True -@ -` mode, where arguments are read from stdin one per line. In affected versions, several caller-supplied strings were interpolated into ExifTool arguments without rejecting line delimiters. A newline or carriage return inside one of those strings could split a single intended argument into multiple ExifTool arguments, allowing argument injection. The fix also rejects NUL bytes as unsafe control characters. Applications that pass attacker-controlled strings to affected APIs may allow an attacker to make ExifTool read files accessible to the ExifTool process, or write output to attacker-chosen file system paths accessible to that process. No remote code execution has been demonstrated. The reported write-path issue is caused by unsanitized tag **keys**. Tag **values** passed to `ExifTool#write` are not affected, because `WriteTask` already encodes whitespace characters in values (e.g. `\n` -> `&#10;`) before transmission. Confirmed affected inputs: - **Tag-name arguments / tag keys** — keys of the `tags` object passed to `ExifTool#write`; entries of the `retain` option to `ExifTool#deleteAllTags`; entries of the `numericTags` option to `ExifTool#read`; the `tagname` argument to `ExifTool#extractBinaryTag` and `#extractBinaryTagToBuffer`. - **Filename / path arguments** to `ExifTool#write`, `#read`, `#readRaw`, `#deleteAllTags`, `#rewriteAllTags`, `#extractBinaryTag`, `#extractBinaryTagToBuffer`, and the binary-extraction convenience methods `#extractJpgFromRaw`, `#extractPreview`, and `#extractThumbnail`. `path.resolve()` does not strip newlines, so an application that accepts attacker-controlled filenames containing newline characters was vulnerable. - **The `imageHashType` option** to `ExifTool#read`. TypeScript types restrict this to a literal union, but JS callers or callers with weakened type checking could reach the sink. Applications that only pass hardcoded strings for tag names, options, and filenames are not affected. ### Patches Fixed in **v35.19.0**. Two layers of defense: 1. **Per-site input validation.** A new `validateTagName` helper rejects any tag-name string containing characters outside the ExifTool tag grammar (letters, digits, `:`, `-`, `_`, and the ExifTool modifiers `*`, `?`, `+`, `#`). Applied at every tag-name interpolation site. 2. **Defense-in-depth at the command renderer.** `ExifToolTask.renderCommand` now rejects _any_ argument containing `\r`, `\n`, or `\0` before it is sent to the ExifTool process. This catches injection via filename arguments, option values, and any future interpolation site that forgets the per-site validator. ### Workarounds Upgrade to v35.19.0 or later. If upgrading immediately is not possible, reject untrusted strings containing control characters before passing them to the affected APIs. Conservative guard: ```ts function assertSafeForExifTool(s: string): void { if (typeof s !== "string" || /[\x00-\x20=<>]/.test(s)) { throw new Error("Rejected unsafe string for ExifTool"); } } ``` Apply to tag names, `retain` / `numericTags` entries, binary-extraction tag names, filenames, and the `imageHashType` option. This is a denylist and is strictly weaker than the library's internal validator; it is sufficient to block the known PoCs but will accept strings that the library itself now rejects. ### Resources - ExifTool `-stay_open` / argument-file documentation: https://exiftool.org/exiftool_pod.html#stay_open-FLAG - ExifTool tag-name reference: https://exiftool.org/TagNames/ - CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/88.html ### Credit - Reporter: Hank Tam - Affiliation: Independent

Source published

5 May 2026 19:53:47 UTC

Source modified

13 May 2026 14:34:31 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH