isomorphic-git: Path traversal via a ".." tree-entry name writes files outside the working directory on clone/checkout
Historical advisory saved 9 Nov 2026 21:02:27 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-cw2g-2vwq-88w6
Published### Summary isomorphic-git's tree parser (`src/models/GitTree.js`) validates each entry name only against the path separators `/` and `\`. It does not reject the standalone reserved name `..`, so a malicious repository can, on a single `clone`/`checkout`, **write files outside the working directory** (unbounded depth). Works on any host-backed `fs` provider. ### Details The guard is: ```js // src/models/GitTree.js if (path.includes('\\') || path.includes('/')) { throw new UnsafeFilepathError(path) } ``` The standalone string `..` passes. isomorphic-git assembles the full path incrementally across tree levels, so nesting `..` trees yields `../escaped.txt`, `../../escaped.txt`, … with unbounded depth (each level is a separate tree object that passes the per-entry guard). On checkout `mkdir(workdir/..)` hits `EEXIST` (ignored) and the file is written above the working directory. Depth is chosen to reach the home dir, `/etc`, `/tmp`, etc.; overwriting a shell rc / config / startup file can escalate to code execution. #### Canonical git behavior (divergence) git rejects this via `verify_path()`: `git read-tree` fails with `error: invalid path '../escaped.txt'` and `git fsck` flags `warning … hasDotdot: contains '..'`. (git's `verify_path` also rejects `.` and `.git`, the latter flagged by fsck as `hasDotgit` — see the fix note below.) GitHub runs fsck on push, so such a tree can't be hosted there; reach is limited to a self-hosted/Smart-HTTP remote or a MitM. ### PoC `https://github.com/spiceoverflow/av2-dotdot-traversal` — open in a Codespace; a single `git.clone()` from the bundled server writes `escaped.txt` one directory above the clone target (`DEPTH=N` escapes N levels): ``` [AV-2] *** PATH TRAVERSAL CONFIRMED *** [AV-2] File written outside workdir: …/escaped.txt ``` ### Impact A path-traversal arbitrary file write outside the working directory (CWE-22), triggered by a single clone/checkout; it can escalate to code execution by overwriting shell rc, config, or startup files. Any application or user that clones/checks out an untrusted (or compromised / MitM'd) repository with isomorphic-git on a host-backed filesystem (**Linux, macOS, or Windows** — no symlink or privilege required). Requires a non-GitHub remote (self-hosted / Smart-HTTP) or a MitM, since GitHub's fsck rejects trees containing `..`. ### Suggested fix In the tree parser, reject any entry name equal to `.` or `..`. For full `verify_path` parity it should **also** reject `.git` (case-insensitively, trailing dots/spaces stripped) and the NTFS 8.3 / HFS variants git blocks. Note: a literal `.git` entry is *not* independently exploitable via `clone`/`checkout` in current isomorphic-git — the checkout walk skips a `.git` tree entry (a sibling file is written but the `.git` entry is not), so rejecting `.git` is defense-in-depth / git parity rather than a separately demonstrated bug. Additionally, normalize and bounds-check the assembled full path against the working-tree root before any filesystem write.
- Source published
- 9 Nov 2026 20:13:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Nov 2026 20:30:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 9 Nov 2026 21:02:27 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE