protobuf.js is Vulnerable to OS Command Injection in the CLI
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-f84p-cvgm-xgjj
Published## Summary `pbts` invoked JSDoc by building a shell command string from input file paths and executing it through `child_process.exec`. File paths containing shell metacharacters could therefore be interpreted by the shell instead of being passed to JSDoc as plain arguments. ## Impact An attacker who can control file names or paths passed to `pbts` may be able to execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the process running `pbts`. This affects the protobufjs CLI tooling path. The protobufjs runtime APIs for encoding, decoding, parsing, and loading protobuf messages are not directly affected by this issue. ## Preconditions - The application or user must invoke `pbts` on file paths influenced by an attacker. - The attacker must be able to supply or create a path containing shell-significant characters. - The vulnerable `pbts` version must execute the generated JSDoc command through a shell. ## Workarounds Do not run affected versions of `pbts` on attacker-controlled file names or paths. If this cannot be avoided, sanitize or rename input files before invoking `pbts`, or run the CLI in an isolated environment with minimal privileges.
- Source published
- 12 May 2026 14:59:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:46 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH