gitoxide: Symlink prefix-reuse allows worktree escape during checkout

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No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.

Source published

13 May 2026 21:36:44 UTC

Source modified

14 May 2026 12:59:51 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.

Source published

May 13, 2026, 9:36:44 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

May 14, 2026, 12:59:51 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

28 Oct 2026 06:07:45 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

gitoxide is an implementation of git written in Rust. Prior to 0.21.1, a malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared gix_worktree::Stack. Internally, this uses a gix_fs::Stack. gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current() caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at gix-fs/src/stack.rs invokes only delegate.push_directory(), never delegate.push(). In gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate, when the state member is State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack, Attributes::push_directory() only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk symlink_metadata() check and unlink-on-collision live in StackDelegate::push()'s invocation of create_leading_directory(), which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain std::os::unix::fs::symlink, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.21.1.

Source published

13 May 2026 22:16:46 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 14:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:17 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Summary A malicious tree can be constructed that will, when checked out with gitoxide, permit writing an attacker-controlled symlink into any existing directory the user has write access to. ### Details During checkout, all symlink index entries are deferred and created after regular files using a single shared `gix_worktree::Stack`. Internally, this uses a `gix_fs::Stack`. `gix_fs::Stack::make_relative_path_current()` caches validated path prefixes: when the previously-processed leaf component exactly matches the leading component(s) of the next path, the leaf-to-directory transition at `gix-fs/src/stack.rs:195-197` invokes only `delegate.push_directory()`, never `delegate.push()`. In `gix_worktree::stack::delegate::StackDelegate`, when the state member is `State::CreateDirectoryAndAttributesStack`, `Attributes::push_directory()` only loads attributes (from the ODB, in the clone case), and does not perform any other checks. The on-disk `symlink_metadata()` check and unlink-on-collision live in `StackDelegate::push()`'s invocation of `create_leading_directory()`, which is therefore bypassed for the cached prefix. The final symlink is created with plain `std::os::unix::fs::symlink`, which follows symlinks in parent directories. Therefore, it's possible to provide a tree with duplicate symlink and directory entries that exploits this. If a tree is constructed with: 1. A `120000` (symlink) entry `a` that points to `.git/hooks`. 2. A `040000` (directory) entry `a` with a subtree that contains a symlink from `post-checkout` to `../../payload`. 3. A `100755` (executable file) entry `payload`. This is converted by `gix_index::State::from_tree()` into index entries `["a" (SYMLINK), "a/post-checkout" (SYMLINK)]`. Then, during the delayed symlink phase: 1. `a` is created as a symlink to e.g. `.git/hooks`. 2. When processing `a/post-checkout`, the `a` prefix is reused from the just-processed leaf entry without re-running the intermediate-directory check, after which… 3. `symlink(target, "<wt>/a/post-checkout")` resolves through the just-created symlink to write `.git/hooks/post-checkout`. Although this example uses `.git/hooks` for simplicity, there's no actual requirement to write within the repo checkout. This can be fairly easily chained into code execution by writing to something that is known to be executed — for example, by writing to `.git/hooks/post-checkout` if the attacker knows that a hook-aware Git implementation will be used later, or by writing to something like `~/.local/bin`. ### PoC Attached is [build-bad-repo.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27223800/build-bad-repo.sh), which builds a repo with the aforementioned tree structure. Cloning it with `gix` will set up the malicious `.git/hooks/post-checkout`, at which point anything that normally invokes the `post-checkout` hook will result in its execution, such as `git checkout -b new-branch`. ### Impact Arbitrary symlink creation into any existing directory the user can write to. ### Disclosure This vulnerability was found by AI (specifically, Claude Mythos) as part of [Project Glasswing](https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing). This advisory was written and verified by a human.

Source published

7 May 2026 00:01:28 UTC

Source modified

26 Sep 2026 11:56:37 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH