Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-73304
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 22:05:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 15:09:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-58527
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
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datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 10:05:00 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 3:09:18 PM
- Source published
- Aug 13, 2026, 10:05:00 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 3:09:18 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 19:40:26 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-73304
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T22:17:25.500
lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:56:50.520
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 22:17:25 UTC
- Source modified
- 8 Sep 2026 20:56:50 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:19:03 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f
Published## Summary The `/api/users/metadata` and `/api/users/metadata/:id` endpoints in `@budibase/server` return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes `oauth2.accessToken` and `oauth2.refreshToken` fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them. ## Details When a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at `packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173`: ```typescript dbUser.oauth2 = { ...dbUser.oauth2, ...details, } await db.put(dbUser) ``` The user metadata endpoints are protected by `PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11`), which maps to the POWER permission set (`packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99`). **Path 1 — List all users** (`GET /api/users/metadata`): 1. `controller.fetchMetadata` → `sdk.users.fetchMetadata()` (`packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78`) 2. → `getGlobalUsers()` → `getRawGlobalUsers()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122`) — strips only `password` and `forceResetPassword` 3. → `processUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76`) — strips only `password` and `roles` 4. The `oauth2` field containing `accessToken` and `refreshToken` is **never removed** **Path 2 — Single user** (`GET /api/users/metadata/:id`): 1. `controller.findMetadata` → `getFullUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6`) 2. → `getGlobalUser()` → `getRawGlobalUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92`) — raw CouchDB fetch, **no field stripping at all** 3. → `processUser()` — strips only `password` and `roles` 4. Same result: `oauth2` tokens are returned There is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app. **Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:** ```bash curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \ -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \ -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.[].oauth2' ``` **Expected output:** `null` for all users (tokens should not be exposed) **Actual output:** For SSO users, the response includes: ```json { "accessToken": "ya29.a0ARrdaM...", "refreshToken": "1//0eXxXxXxXx..." } ``` **Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:** ```bash curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_<sso-user-id>' \ -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \ -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.oauth2' ``` This also returns the full OAuth2 tokens. ## Impact - A user with POWER role in any app can read **all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens** via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs. - Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user. - Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires. - Additionally, `admin`, `builder`, `tenantId`, `ssoId`, and `userGroups` fields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance. ## Recommended Fix Strip sensitive SSO fields in `processUser()` at `packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15`: ```typescript export async function processUser( user: ContextUser, opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {} ) { if (!user || (!user.roles && !user.userGroups)) { return user } user = cloneDeep(user) delete user.password + delete (user as any).oauth2 + delete (user as any).provider + delete (user as any).providerType + delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile + delete (user as any).profile + delete (user as any).ssoId + delete (user as any).forceResetPassword // ... rest of function ``` Additionally, `getRawGlobalUsers()` at line 101 should also strip `oauth2` alongside its existing `password`/`forceResetPassword` stripping for defense in depth.
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 21:14:31 UTC
- Source modified
- 15 Aug 2026 05:20:18 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE