Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-61681
PublishedHatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.
- Source published
- 21 Sep 2026 15:42:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 22:17:06 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 4.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-83976
PublishedHatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 21, 2026, 3:42:21 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 24, 2026, 10:17:06 PM
- Source published
- Sep 21, 2026, 3:42:21 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 24, 2026, 10:17:06 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 9 Nov 2026 14:10:16 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-61681
PublishedHatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-21T16:17:09.823
lastModified: 2026-09-24T23:17:13.400
- Source published
- 21 Sep 2026 16:17:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 23:17:13 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499
Published### Summary The SNS `UnsubscribeConfirmation` handler in `internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go` makes an unvalidated `http.Get()` call to `payload.UnsubscribeURL` without any URL restriction. Because `UnsubscribeURL` is intentionally excluded from the `BuildSignature()` signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the `VerifyPayload()` signature check entirely and triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`. ### Impact This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier account can: - Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS - Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet - Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network context
- Source published
- 22 Sep 2026 20:34:12 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Nov 2026 23:45:05 UTC
- Observed here
- 4 Nov 2026 23:56:21 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6565
PublishedSSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler in github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet
- Source published
- 1 Oct 2026 20:23:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 7 Oct 2026 17:45:13 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.