Woodpecker gRPC agent_id metadata can be spoofed- cross-tenant agent impersonation
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
Published### Impact A vulnerability in Woodpecker CI's gRPC layer allowed any authenticated agent to impersonate any other agent on the same server by injecting a forged `agent_id` value into outgoing gRPC metadata. The server correctly verified the JWT token but then discarded the verified agent identity in favor of the client-supplied value. ### Patches Direct patch: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6567 Later proper fix: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/pull/6569 ### Workarounds Disable org agents (`WOODPECKER_DISABLE_USER_AGENT_REGISTRATION=true`) and delete existing ones ### Resources Public ref: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker/issues/6541 Private com: https://github.com/woodpecker-ci/woodpecker-security/issues/21
- Source published
- 14 Jul 2026 19:00:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Jul 2026 19:19:07 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · HIGH