Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation
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cve-program · CVE-2026-54353
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
- Source published
- 26 Jun 2026 20:44:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 29 Jun 2026 13:17:32 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-39915
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 26, 2026, 8:44:52 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 29, 2026, 1:17:32 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1806: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-54353 · CVE-2026-54352 · CVE-2026-54351
- Source published
- Jun 26, 2026, 8:44:52 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jun 29, 2026, 1:17:32 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 21 Nov 2026 17:18:40 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-54353
PublishedBudibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-367 · CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-26T21:16:35.417
lastModified: 2026-06-30T20:05:11.687
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:budibase:budibase:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 26 Jun 2026 21:16:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Jun 2026 20:05:11 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 13:17:28 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf
PublishedSummary Authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. Details The issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice: During blacklist validation Again during the real socket connection The first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP. This creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue. Affected flow in: packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts ``` async function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise<void> { const parsed = parseUrl(url) if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) { throw new Error("URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.") } } for (let redirects = 0; redirects <= MAX_REDIRECTS; redirects++) { await throwIfUnsafe(nextUrl) const response = await fetchFn(nextUrl, nextRequest) // ... } ``` fetchFn uses plain node-fetch with no custom http.Agent / https.Agent, so the underlying socket performs its own independent dns.lookup after validation completes. The same pattern also exists in: packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts ``` await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl) const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest) ``` The blacklist implementation resolves hostnames but only returns a boolean: packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts ``` async function lookup(address: string): Promise<string[]> { address = parseAddress(address) const addresses = await performLookup(address, { all: true }) return addresses.map(addr => addr.address) } export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> { // ... if (!net.isIP(address)) { try { ips = await lookup(address) } catch (e) { /* ... */ } } else { ips = [address] } return ips.some(ip => blackList!.check(ip, getIpVersion(ip))) } ``` The resolved IPs are discarded, so callers cannot pin the later socket connection to the validated addresses. An attacker controlling authoritative DNS for a hostname can therefore return: a public IP during validation a private/internal IP during the actual connection Anything routing through these helpers inherits the issue, including: outgoing webhook Slack Discord Make Zapier n8n AI extract object-store fetches Several of these steps return upstream response content directly into automation output, which makes the SSRF non-blind. PoC Tested locally against a self-hosted build from master. No Budibase-operated infrastructure was touched. Run Budibase locally. Start a harmless local HTTP listener: python3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 127.0.0.1 Use a rebinding hostname such as: 7f000001.cb007264.rbndr.us which rotates between: 127.0.0.1 203.0.113.100 Steps to reproduce: Log into Budibase with automation permissions. Create an automation using the Outgoing Webhook step. Set the URL to: http://<rebinding-host>:8080/ Trigger the automation. Observed result: The blacklist validation resolves the hostname to the public IP and allows the request. node-fetch performs a second DNS lookup during socket creation. The second lookup resolves to 127.0.0.1. The TCP connection lands on the local service. The local server response body appears directly in the automation output. Impact This produces a non-blind read-SSRF primitive against anything reachable from the Budibase host process, including: loopback services (127.0.0.1) RFC1918 ranges internal Kubernetes/VPC services cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) On cloud deployments without IMDSv2 enforcement, this may expose temporary IAM credentials via: /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> On multi-tenant hosted deployments, this may also create potential cross-tenant access paths through shared internal infrastructure.
- Source published
- 22 Jun 2026 23:39:24 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Aug 2026 19:00:07 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH