KubeEdge: Unbounded allocation in viaduct packer enables authenticated remote DoS against CloudHub
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-gfw4-49f9-cp25
Published## Summary KubeEdge CloudHub uses the viaduct packer to decode messages received from connected peers. The packer reads a 32-bit payload length from the message header and previously allocated a buffer of that size without enforcing an upper bound. An authenticated peer that can establish a viaduct connection to CloudHub can send a crafted message header containing an excessively large payload length. This may cause CloudHub to allocate a large amount of memory and can result in memory exhaustion, process termination, or denial of service. ## Impact A successfully authenticated malicious or compromised edge node may repeatedly send crafted viaduct message headers to increase CloudHub memory consumption. Depending on available memory and deployment limits, exploitation may cause: * Increased CloudHub memory usage * Out-of-memory termination * CloudHub restart loops * Temporary disruption of cloud-edge communication Authentication to the viaduct endpoint is required. This issue does not provide unauthenticated access or direct code execution. ## Root cause The viaduct packer trusted the payload length encoded in the message header and allocated the payload buffer before validating whether the declared length was within an acceptable range. ## Fix The fix introduces a maximum viaduct payload size of 32 MiB. The updated implementation: * Rejects oversized payload lengths in the reader before memory allocation * Enforces the same maximum size in the writer * Adds regression tests covering oversized and valid payloads Fixes have been prepared for the following patch releases: * KubeEdge v1.23.1 * KubeEdge v1.22.2 * KubeEdge v1.21.2 These versions should not be listed as released until the coordinated release process is complete. ## Workarounds Before patched versions are available, operators should: * Restrict access to the CloudHub endpoint to trusted edge nodes and networks * Protect and rotate edge-node credentials * Revoke credentials belonging to decommissioned or potentially compromised nodes * Apply memory limits and restart policies to the CloudHub workload * Monitor CloudHub memory consumption and unexpected connection activity ## Affected component * `pkg/viaduct/pkg/packer` * CloudHub viaduct message-processing path ## Credits KubeEdge thanks Sang-Hoon Choi ([KoreaSecurity](https://github.com/KoreaSecurity), Sejong University) for responsibly reporting this issue and for coordinating with the KubeEdge maintainers through the security disclosure process.
- Source published
- 22 Sep 2026 20:37:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Oct 2026 20:56:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
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- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · MODERATE