Next.js: HTTP request smuggling in rewrites
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-ggv3-7p47-pfv8
Published## Summary When Next.js rewrites proxy traffic to an external backend, a crafted `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` request using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` could trigger request boundary disagreement between the proxy and backend. This could allow request smuggling through rewritten routes. ## Impact An attacker could smuggle a second request to unintended backend routes (for example, internal/admin endpoints), bypassing assumptions that only the configured rewrite destination/path is reachable. This does not impact applications hosted on providers that handle rewrites at the CDN level, such as Vercel. ## Patches The vulnerability originated in an upstream library vendored by Next.js. It is fixed by updating that dependency’s behavior so `content-length: 0` is added only when both `content-length` and `transfer-encoding` are absent, and `transfer-encoding` is no longer removed in that code path. ## Workarounds If upgrade is not immediately possible: - Block chunked `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` requests on rewritten routes at your edge/proxy. - Enforce authentication/authorization on backend routes per our [security guidance](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/guides/data-security).
- Source published
- 17 Mar 2026 16:17:15 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:39 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE