Malicious code in @solana-labs/ancor (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-5786
Published--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3265b293c8d6ebf4e866644687ab8bb9f03345c704acf7c885574886ad396b5b) Package is published as `@solana-labs/ancor` — a name one character off from `anchor`, the well-known Solana smart-contract framework (published as `@coral-xyz/anchor`, formerly `@project-serum/anchor`). The `@solana-labs` scope and the near-miss spelling `ancor` together create high confusion potential for developers searching for the Anchor framework. The shipped bundles `lib/index.cjs.js` and `lib/index.esm.js` are large minified rollups (~11k+ lines) that include `require('child_process')`, `fetch(...)` POST calls, and references to `curl` / `ping`. Pattern matches on keyword co-occurrence in a minified bundle do not by themselves prove malicious intent — Anchor and similar frameworks legitimately bundle child_process and HTTP for build/CLI tooling — but the combination of a typosquat-shaped name, a vendor-impersonating scope, and a large opaque bundle warrants human review before this version is allowed into installer environments. A reviewer should verify scope ownership (is `@solana-labs` actually controlled by Solana Labs, or a squatted scope?), de-minify the flagged regions around lines 5016/5046 and 11336/11441 to confirm whether the POST/fetch destinations and child_process spawns are part of a documented build/CLI flow or an exfiltration path, and compare bundle behavior against legitimate `@coral-xyz/anchor`.
- Source published
- 15 Jun 2026 17:17:17 UTC
- Source modified
- 1 Sep 2026 11:30:53 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.