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Tract: Arbitrary file read via unsanitized ONNX external_data `location` (path traversal) on model load in tract-onnx

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cve-program · CVE-2026-55832

Published

Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2, the tract-onnx crate passes the attacker-controlled external_data location from an ONNX model through onnx/src/tensor.rs get_external_resources and joins the value to the model directory without rejecting absolute paths or parent directory components. Loading an untrusted model through model_for_path can therefore make onnx/src/data_resolver.rs MmapDataResolver open an arbitrary local file and place the file contents into model tensors or inference output. Attacker-controlled offset and length fields can also select an out-of-range mapping slice and cause a denial of service, but the flaw does not write files or execute code. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2.

Source published
14 Sep 2026 17:57:41 UTC
Source modified
14 Sep 2026 18:12:59 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2026-77721

Published

Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2, the tract-onnx crate passes the attacker-controlled external_data location from an ONNX model through onnx/src/tensor.rs get_external_resources and joins the value to the model directory without rejecting absolute paths or parent directory components. Loading an untrusted model through model_for_path can therefore make onnx/src/data_resolver.rs MmapDataResolver open an arbitrary local file and place the file contents into model tensors or inference output. Attacker-controlled offset and length fields can also select an out-of-range mapping slice and cause a denial of service, but the flaw does not write files or execute code. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2.

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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Sep 14, 2026, 5:57:41 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 14, 2026, 6:12:59 PM

Source published
Sep 14, 2026, 5:57:41 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 14, 2026, 6:12:59 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
16 Nov 2026 02:49:19 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

nvd · CVE-2026-55832

Published

Tract is a tiny, no-nonsense, self-contained TensorFlow and ONNX inference toolkit. Prior to 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2, the tract-onnx crate passes the attacker-controlled external_data location from an ONNX model through onnx/src/tensor.rs get_external_resources and joins the value to the model directory without rejecting absolute paths or parent directory components. Loading an untrusted model through model_for_path can therefore make onnx/src/data_resolver.rs MmapDataResolver open an arbitrary local file and place the file contents into model tensors or inference output. Attacker-controlled offset and length fields can also select an out-of-range mapping slice and cause a denial of service, but the flaw does not write files or execute code. This issue is fixed in versions 0.21.17, 0.22.3, and 0.23.2.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-14T18:17:55.663

lastModified: 2026-09-30T19:57:08.043

Source published
14 Sep 2026 18:17:55 UTC
Source modified
30 Sep 2026 19:57:08 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:05 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

osv · GHSA-h668-6x6g-f8r5

Published

### Summary `tract` (the `tract-onnx` crate) resolves an ONNX tensor's external-data `location` by joining it onto the model directory **without any sanitization**. Because `location` comes from the (untrusted) `.onnx` file, a malicious model can make `tract` open and read an **arbitrary local file** at load time, with the file's contents flowing into the model's tensors / inference output (read-only file disclosure). This is the ONNX external-data path-traversal class that the reference `onnx` library hardened over several CVEs; `tract` resolves `location` itself and was never hardened. ### Details In `onnx/src/tensor.rs`, `get_external_resources()` builds the path with no checks: ```rust let location = /* tensor.external_data "location" value — attacker-controlled */; let p = PathBuf::from(path).join(location); // no is_absolute / ".." / canonicalize / containment check provider.read_bytes_from_path(&mut tensor_data, &p, offset, length)?; // Mmap::map(File::open(p)) by default ``` - `Path::join` with an **absolute** `location` (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) discards the base directory → `p = /etc/passwd`. - A **relative** `../../../../etc/passwd` value is not normalized → directory traversal. - The default `MmapDataResolver` (`onnx/src/data_resolver.rs`) then `mmap`s the file and copies `mmap[offset..offset+length]` into the tensor. `offset`/`length` are also taken from the file; an out-of-range slice **panics** (DoS). No `is_absolute`, `..`, `canonicalize`, or containment check exists anywhere on this path (`tensor.rs`, `model.rs`, `data_resolver.rs`). Reachable from the standard public API: `model_for_path(p)` (`onnx/src/model.rs`) sets `model_dir = p.parent()` and calls `load_tensor(proto, model_dir)` → `get_external_resources(.., model_dir)`. ### PoC Tested on `tract-onnx 0.21.16` (crates.io), Rust 1.96. 1. A canary file the model must not be able to read: `/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` → `TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b` 2. Build a small `evil.onnx` with a `UINT8[37]` initializer whose `external_data` is `location=/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt` (absolute), `offset=0`, `length=37`, fed through `Identity` to the output (raw protobuf serialization): ```python import onnx from onnx import helper, TensorProto, StringStringEntryProto N = 37; LOC = "/tmp/tract_canary_secret.txt" # absolute -> Path::join discards the base dir w = TensorProto(); w.name = "W"; w.data_type = TensorProto.UINT8 w.dims.extend([N]); w.data_location = TensorProto.EXTERNAL for k, v in [("location", LOC), ("offset", "0"), ("length", str(N))]: e = StringStringEntryProto(); e.key = k; e.value = v; w.external_data.append(e) node = helper.make_node("Identity", ["W"], ["Y"]) out = helper.make_tensor_value_info("Y", TensorProto.UINT8, [N]) g = helper.make_graph([node], "g", [], [out], initializer=[w]) m = helper.make_model(g, opset_imports=[helper.make_opsetid("", 13)]) open("evil.onnx", "wb").write(m.SerializeToString()) ``` 3. Victim loads the untrusted model with the standard API: ```rust let model = tract_onnx::onnx().model_for_path("evil.onnx")?; let out = model.into_optimized()?.into_runnable()?.run(tvec!())?; let bytes: Vec<u8> = out[0].to_array_view::<u8>()?.iter().cloned().collect(); println!("{:?}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes)); ``` Output: ``` "TRACT-EXTDATA-TRAVERSAL-CANARY-7f3a2b" ``` i.e. the contents of the arbitrary local file were read by `tract` and surfaced in the inference output. ### Impact Read-only arbitrary local file disclosure when an application uses `tract` to load an untrusted or shared ONNX model (model hubs, multi-file repos, user uploads). The file content is recoverable from the model's tensors / inference output. Secondary: denial of service (panic) via out-of-bounds `offset`/`length`. No write or code execution. ### Suggested fix Reject absolute `location` and any `..` component, then canonicalize and verify the resolved path stays within the model directory (mirroring `onnx` 1.22.0's `resolve_external_data_location`); reject symlinks; validate `offset`/`length` against the file size before slicing.

Source published
19 Jun 2026 14:45:43 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:49 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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