Malicious code in @demica/shared (npm)
Exploitation and risk
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osv · MAL-2026-5351
Published**Note:** *This report is updated by a verification record* Dep-confusion squat of internal @demica/shared at sentinel high version 99.99.100 + auto-exec postinstall (canary.js) beaconing to RAW IP 157.230.17.236:80/dc. Sentinel-high-version + auto-exec beacon = MALICIOUS per operator policy (c913); "authorized canary" framing does NOT downgrade, raw-IP dest matches masterkrweb. 6-pkg @demica canary campaign. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (becb5aca9f28fbd99a4f45ed70489960879ba81cfbd2071648c98cf5e867d8f9) On install, the package's postinstall hook (`node canary.js postinstall` per package.json) issues an unconditional HTTP GET to bare IP 157.230.17.236:80 at path `/dc` with query params containing the package name, version, a nonce, and the lifecycle phase. No environment variables, filesystem contents, or credentials are read or transmitted; the payload is limited to package metadata. The README describes this as an authorized dependency-confusion canary against the @demica scope. The fact-of-install ping is otherwise benign, but it performs unconsented outbound network at install time, the destination is a bare IP over cleartext HTTP with no authentication or pinning, and the same postinstall hook is a position from which a future republish could deliver arbitrary payloads. Routing to human review so the @demica organization can confirm the canary is theirs and that the destination IP is operator-controlled. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d2d0202ffac4ede64b63611e7b71ba7f8858b530da496ed5068829da36d08369) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
- Source published
- 9 Jun 2026 07:53:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Aug 2026 22:15:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.