Klever-Go: Unbounded goroutine spawn on direct-message ingress enables peer-driven DoS

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Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node's availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.

Source published

7 Aug 2026 22:36:53 UTC

Source modified

10 Aug 2026 13:36:07 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node's availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.

Source published

Aug 7, 2026, 10:36:53 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Aug 10, 2026, 1:36:07 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 11:36:34 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node's availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.

Source published

7 Aug 2026 23:17:04 UTC

Source modified

24 Oct 2026 16:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 13:17:10 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

### Summary `networkMessenger.directMessageHandler` in `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go` spawns a fresh goroutine for every incoming direct message before the antiflood layer makes an admission decision. There is no semaphore, throttler, or bound on concurrent in-flight spawns. A single connected libp2p peer can open a `DirectSendID` stream and send well-formed `TopicMessage` envelopes with varying sequence numbers. Each accepted direct message reaches `directMessageHandler` and triggers a fresh goroutine before `processor.ProcessReceivedMessage` runs. This allows unbounded goroutine growth and node availability degradation from one peer. This remains present in the latest release `v1.7.17`: `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1060` still spawns `go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P)` before `processor.ProcessReceivedMessage`. I also verified current `develop` commit `10bcfd50`, where the same spawn remains at `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go:1115`. This is distinct from GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226 and GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v. Those advisories concern `MultiDataInterceptor` decompression/throttler behavior. This report concerns the libp2p direct-message ingress wrapper spawning an unbounded goroutine before processor-level antiflood/admission logic runs. A patch to `Batch.Decompress` or `MultiDataInterceptor` does not bound this direct-message goroutine spawn. ### Details The affected path is `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go` in `directMessageHandler`. The direct-message path transforms and validates the message, looks up the topic processor, then immediately spawns a goroutine: ```go func (netMes *networkMessenger) directMessageHandler(message *pubsub.Message, fromConnectedPeer core.PeerID) error { var processor p2p.MessageProcessor topic := *message.Topic msg, err := netMes.transformAndCheckMessage(message, fromConnectedPeer, topic) if err != nil { return err } netMes.mutTopics.RLock() processor = netMes.processors[topic] netMes.mutTopics.RUnlock() if processor == nil { return fmt.Errorf("%w on directMessageHandler for topic %s", p2p.ErrNilValidator, topic) } go func(msg p2p.MessageP2P) { if check.IfNil(msg) { return } errProcess := processor.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer) // ... }(msg) return nil } ``` The processor-level antiflood decision happens inside `ProcessReceivedMessage`, after the goroutine, its stack, and the cloned message reference already exist. That means antiflood can bound processing rate, but not goroutine creation rate. The existing `goRoutinesThrottler` with capacity `broadcastGoRoutines = 1000` is wired into outgoing broadcast paths such as `BroadcastOnChannelBlocking`, not this incoming direct-message path. The parallel pubsub ingress path in the same file handles a comparable inbound message surface synchronously: ```go err = handler.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, fromConnectedPeer) ``` So the direct-message path is asymmetric: same transform/check function, same `ProcessReceivedMessage` callee, but direct-message ingress adds an unbounded goroutine spawn. Reachability: - `directSender.go` registers `DirectSendID` as a libp2p stream protocol. - `directStreamHandler` reads framed `pubsub.Message` envelopes from the stream. - `directStreamHandler` forwards each message to `networkMessenger.directMessageHandler`. - Any connected peer can send well-formed envelopes to registered topics. - The `seenMessages` cache keys on `From + Seqno`; `Seqno` is attacker-controlled in the envelope, so incrementing it bypasses dedupe. ### PoC GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting does not appear to allow file attachments in this form, so I am including the reproduction command and captured output inline. I can provide the full Go test file immediately if useful. The PoC is a Go test file intended to be placed under `network/p2p/libp2p/` in a `klever-go` checkout. It exercises the real `network/p2p/libp2p` package with `NewMockMessenger`. Reproduction: ```bash git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go cd klever-go git checkout v1.7.16 # Place dos_directmsg_test.go into: # network/p2p/libp2p/ go test ./network/p2p/libp2p/ -run TestPoC_ -count=1 -v -timeout 60s ``` Captured output: ```text === RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_SpawnsGoroutinePerMessage baseline goroutines: 43 peak goroutines after 500 direct messages: 543 (delta = 500) final goroutines after drain + GC: 43 POC_RESULT direct=spawn N=500 baseline=43 peak=543 delta=500 threshold=400 final=43 --- PASS === RUN TestPoC_SynchronousHandler_NoGoroutineGrowth baseline goroutines: 47 peak goroutines after 500 synchronous calls: 47 (delta = 0) POC_RESULT sync=block N=500 baseline=47 peak=47 delta=0 --- PASS === RUN TestPoC_DirectMessageHandler_NoThrottlerInPath all 2000 SendToConnectedPeer calls returned in 2.490708ms -- no throttler blocking POC_RESULT throttler=absent N=2000 elapsed=2.490708ms --- PASS ``` Reading: 1. 500 direct messages with slow processors produced exactly 500 new goroutines. 2. The synchronous control path produced zero goroutine growth. 3. 2000 messages, twice the outgoing `broadcastGoRoutines = 1000` capacity, returned immediately, showing no ingress throttler blocks this path. ### Impact A single connected peer can sustain unbounded goroutine spawn growth on a klever-go node. Each spawned goroutine allocates its own stack, holds message references until the processor returns, and adds scheduler and GC pressure before antiflood admission can reject the message. Under realistic attacker line rate and non-trivial processor latency, goroutine count can grow faster than the runtime drains it, degrading the node's ability to process legitimate traffic. This maps to the `SECURITY.md` High category: "Denial of Service affecting network availability." All testing was local only. I did not contact Klever mainnet, public testnet, hosted RPCs, explorers, or third-party production infrastructure. Suggested fixes: 1. Wire `goRoutinesThrottler.CanProcess()` or a dedicated ingress throttler before the `go func()` spawn in `directMessageHandler`. 2. Or remove the goroutine and call `ProcessReceivedMessage` synchronously, matching the existing `pubsubCallback` path. Disclosure note: I originally sent this report to `[email protected]` on 2026-05-13. Since `SECURITY.md` lists GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting as the recommended channel, I am resubmitting it here.

Source published

5 Jun 2026 16:41:23 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:11:44 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

klever-go: Unbounded goroutine spawn on direct-message ingress enables peer-driven DoS in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Source published

25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:01:11 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.