Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Forge: PKCS#12 MAC forgery and constant-key PBE via zero iteration count

Historical advisory saved 30 Oct 2026 23:45:44 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-jc66-7q78-782g

Published

### Summary forge.pkcs12.pkcs12FromAsn1() accepts a PKCS#12 MAC iteration count of zero (or less) from the input, and the PKCS#12 key derivation function then returns a constant key that does not depend on the password or salt. An attacker who does not know the password can modify a PKCS#12/PFX file and compute a MAC that verifies with any password; PKCS#12 PBE-encrypted private keys prepared the same way decrypt with any password. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. ### Details `p12.pkcs12FromAsn1()` in `lib/pkcs12.js` reads the MAC iteration count (`MacData.iterations`) from the input and passes it to the PKCS#12 key derivation function `pki.pbe.generatePkcs12Key()` in `lib/pbe.js` (also exposed as `forge.pkcs12.generateKey()`) without checking that it is at least 1. The key derivation function (RFC 7292 Appendix B.2) runs its hash loop `iter` times. With an iteration count of 0 (or an empty or negative INTEGER), no hashing is done and the function returns the PKCS#12 diversifier ID byte repeated, for example `0x03` repeated 20 times for an HMAC-SHA1 MAC key. The result does not depend on the password or the salt, so anyone can compute a valid MAC over arbitrary PFX contents. The same key derivation function is used by `pki.pbe.getCipherForPKCS12PBE()` for the PKCS#12 password-based encryption schemes `pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC` and `pbewithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC`, whose `pkcs-12PbeParams` iteration count is also read from the input. With an iteration count of 0 or less, the encryption key and IV are constants (`0x01` and `0x02` repeated). This is reached from shrouded key bags and encrypted SafeContents in `pkcs12FromAsn1()`, and from `forge.pki.decryptPrivateKeyInfo()` (for example for `ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY` PEM input). RFC 7292 defines `MacData` with `iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 1`; an iteration count only makes sense as 1 or more (RFC 8018 uses `INTEGER (1..MAX)` for the same concept). PBES2 (PBKDF2) encrypted content is not affected. The fix rejects iteration counts less than 1 when verifying a PKCS#12 MAC in `pkcs12FromAsn1()` ("PKCS#12 MAC iteration count must be >= 1.") and at the entry of `pki.pbe.generatePkcs12Key()` ("PKCS#12 key derivation iteration count must be >= 1."), which covers the MAC, both PKCS#12 PBE schemes and direct `forge.pkcs12.generateKey()` callers. ### Patches Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Iteration counts less than 1 are now rejected when verifying a PKCS#12 MAC and in the PKCS#12 key derivation function. ### Workarounds Before calling `forge.pkcs12.pkcs12FromAsn1()`, reject inputs whose `MacData.iterations` is present and less than 1. For encrypted private keys using the PKCS#12 PBE schemes, there is no simple workaround other than checking the `pkcs-12PbeParams` iteration count before decryption, or upgrading. ### Credits Reported by Thai, Calif.io in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research. ### Proof of concept Take any PKCS#12/PFX file, replace its AuthenticatedSafe with attacker-chosen content (for example the attacker's certificate and an unencrypted private key), set `MacData.iterations` to 0 (DER `02 01 00`), and compute the HMAC-SHA1 over the new content with the key `0x03` repeated 20 times. On node-forge <= 1.4.0, `forge.pkcs12.pkcs12FromAsn1(asn1, password)` reports successful MAC verification for whatever password the application supplies and returns the attacker's certificate and key. An empty or negative iteration count behaves the same way. Likewise, a shrouded key bag or `ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY` using `pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC` with iteration count 0 decrypts with any password. The constant key is visible directly: ```js var salt = new forge.util.ByteBuffer('anysalt'); forge.pkcs12.generateKey('any password', salt, 3, 0, 20).toHex(); // <= 1.4.0: '0303030303030303030303030303030303030303' // 1.4.1: throws "PKCS#12 key derivation iteration count must be >= 1." ``` The fix adds regression tests in `tests/unit/pkcs12.js` and the reporter's PoC in `tests/pocs/`. ### Impact Applications that import PKCS#12/PFX files or PKCS#8 encrypted private keys from untrusted sources with `forge.pkcs12.pkcs12FromAsn1()` or `forge.pki.decryptPrivateKeyInfo()`, and rely on the password-based MAC or on successful decryption to establish that the file was produced by someone who knows the password. The default API and call pattern are affected; no password, oracle or user interaction is needed, only one offline HMAC. An attacker can supply a PKCS#12 file with certificates and private keys of their choice (for example, replaced certificates or an unencrypted private key) that node-forge reports as verified under the application's password. The attacker does not learn the password or the original private key. PBES2 (PBKDF2) encrypted content is not affected.

Source published
30 Oct 2026 23:02:05 UTC
Source modified
30 Oct 2026 23:15:04 UTC
Saved here
30 Oct 2026 23:45:44 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 17 Nov 00:39 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current