GeoLens: Cross-dataset authorization bypass discloses private dataset metadata, schema, sample values, table rows, and raster/vector tile data

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GeoLens is a self-hosted geospatial data catalog with semantic search, OGC and STAC APIs, and a map builder. Prior to 1.2.3, multiple read and link endpoints authorize only the resource named in the request URL and fail to re-authorize a second caller-influenced dataset reached through a relationship, map layer, VRT source, externalId lookup, or request body. When a public map references a private dataset, anonymous callers can use GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json to obtain the private layer's metadata, sampled values, or vector tiles. The style response can expose a replayable HMAC tile URL that is bound to neither a user nor a map. When a public source dataset has a relationship to a private target dataset, anonymous callers can use the dataset relationship APIs to enumerate the relationship and read rows from the private target's backing table. Anonymous callers can also use GET /collections/datasets/items with an externalId dataset UUID to obtain metadata for any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset because that lookup performs no visibility check. Authenticated users with the default editor role can mosaic another user's private raster into an owned VRT and read its pixels, and POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} accepts a body-controlled dataset_id without a visibility check and returns private metadata and sample values. Pre-existing vrt_source_links also expose unauthorized member metadata and health unless each member is filtered at read time. These paths can disclose vector geometries and attributes, raster pixels, table rows, table names, column schemas, feature counts, extents, source URLs and filenames, contacts, and sampled row values. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.3.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 14:58:39 UTC

Source modified

17 Sep 2026 14:44:24 UTC

Saved here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

GeoLens is a self-hosted geospatial data catalog with semantic search, OGC and STAC APIs, and a map builder. Prior to 1.2.3, multiple read and link endpoints authorize only the resource named in the request URL and fail to re-authorize a second caller-influenced dataset reached through a relationship, map layer, VRT source, externalId lookup, or request body. When a public map references a private dataset, anonymous callers can use GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json to obtain the private layer's metadata, sampled values, or vector tiles. The style response can expose a replayable HMAC tile URL that is bound to neither a user nor a map. When a public source dataset has a relationship to a private target dataset, anonymous callers can use the dataset relationship APIs to enumerate the relationship and read rows from the private target's backing table. Anonymous callers can also use GET /collections/datasets/items with an externalId dataset UUID to obtain metadata for any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset because that lookup performs no visibility check. Authenticated users with the default editor role can mosaic another user's private raster into an owned VRT and read its pixels, and POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} accepts a body-controlled dataset_id without a visibility check and returns private metadata and sample values. Pre-existing vrt_source_links also expose unauthorized member metadata and health unless each member is filtered at read time. These paths can disclose vector geometries and attributes, raster pixels, table rows, table names, column schemas, feature counts, extents, source URLs and filenames, contacts, and sampled row values. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.3.

Source published

Sep 15, 2026, 2:58:39 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Sep 17, 2026, 2:44:24 PM (timezone not stated)

Saved here

12 Nov 2026 03:03:35 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

GeoLens is a self-hosted geospatial data catalog with semantic search, OGC and STAC APIs, and a map builder. Prior to 1.2.3, multiple read and link endpoints authorize only the resource named in the request URL and fail to re-authorize a second caller-influenced dataset reached through a relationship, map layer, VRT source, externalId lookup, or request body. When a public map references a private dataset, anonymous callers can use GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json to obtain the private layer's metadata, sampled values, or vector tiles. The style response can expose a replayable HMAC tile URL that is bound to neither a user nor a map. When a public source dataset has a relationship to a private target dataset, anonymous callers can use the dataset relationship APIs to enumerate the relationship and read rows from the private target's backing table. Anonymous callers can also use GET /collections/datasets/items with an externalId dataset UUID to obtain metadata for any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset because that lookup performs no visibility check. Authenticated users with the default editor role can mosaic another user's private raster into an owned VRT and read its pixels, and POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} accepts a body-controlled dataset_id without a visibility check and returns private metadata and sample values. Pre-existing vrt_source_links also expose unauthorized member metadata and health unless each member is filtered at read time. These paths can disclose vector geometries and attributes, raster pixels, table rows, table names, column schemas, feature counts, extents, source URLs and filenames, contacts, and sampled row values. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.3.

Source published

15 Sep 2026 15:17:18 UTC

Source modified

30 Sep 2026 17:51:56 UTC

Saved here

25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

### Summary Multiple GeoLens read/link endpoints authorized only the resource named in the request URL (a map, a VRT, a source dataset, an AI request) and failed to re-authorize a **second, caller-influenced dataset** that the request reached through a relationship, layer reference, mosaic source, or request body. This "authorize the URL resource, read a *different* dataset un-re-authorized" pattern let callers read data from datasets they have no access to. The most severe instances require **no authentication at all** (anonymous, network-only). Others require only the **default `editor` role** that any self-service signup / upload user receives. All issues are fixed in **1.2.3**. There is no complete configuration workaround — upgrading is the only full remediation. ### Impact Depending on the endpoint, an attacker can read, for datasets they cannot otherwise access: - the dataset's **vector tile data** (actual feature geometries/attributes), - the dataset's **raster pixels**, - backing-table **rows**, - and **metadata** — table name, column schema, feature count, extent, source URL/filename, contacts, and **sampled row values**. ### Affected versions All versions **prior to 1.2.3** (includes the published 1.0.0, 1.2.0, and 1.2.2 releases and their PyPI/npm/GHCR artifacts). Fixed in **1.2.3**. ### Findings **1. Anonymous metadata + private vector-tile disclosure via public maps (PR #235)** `GET /maps/{id}` and `GET /maps/{id}/style.json` authorized the map but not each layer's backing dataset. A public map that references a private dataset leaked that dataset's table name, column schema, feature count, extent, and sampled values to anonymous callers. `style.json` additionally returned a vector-tile URL carrying an HMAC signature bound to **neither user nor map**, which the tile endpoint accepts for non-public datasets with no user check — so the signature is **replayable** to read the private dataset's actual vector tiles. *(Anonymous · High)* **2. Anonymous private-row disclosure via dataset relationships (PR #234)** The dataset FK-relationship APIs authorized only the source dataset from the URL, never the relationship target. A public dataset with a relationship to a private dataset let an anonymous caller enumerate the relationship (obtaining the private target's id/title and the relationship id) and then call the related-record endpoint to read **rows from the private target's backing table**. *(Anonymous · High)* **3. Anonymous metadata disclosure via OGC `externalId` lookup (PR #236)** `GET /collections/datasets/items?externalId=<uuid>` resolved the dataset by id and returned the full OGC catalog record (title, summary, bbox, keywords, contacts, distributions, source org) with **no visibility check** — the user was never threaded into the lookup. An anonymous caller could read any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset's metadata by UUID. *(Anonymous · High)* **4. Cross-tenant raster pixel disclosure via VRT mosaics — SEC-C (PR #237)** An authenticated user with the default `editor` upload permission could mosaic another user's **private raster** into a VRT they own, then read the victim's **pixels** back through raster tile / quicklook / COG endpoints that authorize only the attacker-owned VRT. VRT member pixels are compiled into one served asset and cannot be filtered at read time, so the fix authorizes every source dataset at write/link time. *(Authenticated `editor` · High)* **5. Cross-tenant metadata/sample-data disclosure via AI metadata endpoints — SEC-D (PR #238)** The `POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement}` endpoints were gated only by the `use_ai_chat` permission (held by the default `editor` role). The attacker-controlled `dataset_id` in the request body flowed into the LLM prompt context with no visibility filter, rendering **any** dataset's title, summary, source URL, filename, column schema, and **sample values** into the response. *(Authenticated `editor` · High)* **6. Residual VRT member disclosure for legacy links — SEC-E (PR #237)** Link-time authorization (finding 4) does not re-authorize pre-existing `vrt_source_links`, so legacy or authorization-drift links still leaked member metadata and health via the VRT source-listing/status endpoints until a per-member read filter was added. *(Medium)* ### Patches Fixed in **1.2.3** by, in order: - `31a103b9` — fix(catalog): authorize relationship targets in related-record endpoints (#234) - `01bc87da` — fix(maps): re-authorize each layer's dataset on anonymous map read endpoints (#235) - `407c0688` — fix(ogc): enforce dataset visibility on the externalId OGC item lookup (#236) - `2c031da8` — fix(vrt): authorize VRT source datasets at link time + filter unauthorized members on read (#237) - `07dfb1c6` — fix(ai): authorize the requested dataset on AI metadata endpoints (#238) The fixes follow the codebase's established per-dataset re-authorization pattern (`can_access_dataset` / `check_dataset_access_or_anonymous`), filtering at read time and authorizing cross-dataset references at link/write time. ### Workarounds There is **no complete configuration workaround**; the anonymous findings require only network access to the API. Operators who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict network exposure of the API and avoid co-locating private datasets with public maps/relationships, but **upgrading to 1.2.3 is the only full remediation**. ### Remediation Upgrade to GeoLens **1.2.3**: - Container images: `ghcr.io/geolens-io/geolens-api:1.2.3` (+ worker/frontend) - Python SDK: `geolens==1.2.3` · CLI: `geolens-cli==1.2.3` · npm: `@geolens/[email protected]`

Source published

18 Aug 2026 18:00:07 UTC

Source modified

19 Aug 2026 12:55:45 UTC

Saved here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH