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Fedify vulnerable to allowing access to internal network resources

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2024-39687

Published

Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub and other standards. At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network. This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well. Specifically this is a Server Side Request Forgery attack. Users should upgrade to Fedify version 0.9.2, 0.10.1, or 0.11.1 to receive a patch for this issue.

Source published
5 Jul 2024 17:39:34 UTC
Source modified
2 Aug 2024 04:26:16 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

euvd · EUVD-2024-2391

Published

Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub and other standards. At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network. This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well. Specifically this is a Server Side Request Forgery attack. Users should upgrade to Fedify version 0.9.2, 0.10.1, or 0.11.1 to receive a patch for this issue.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 5, 2024, 5:39:34 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 2, 2024, 4:26:16 AM

Source published
Jul 5, 2024, 5:39:34 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 2, 2024, 4:26:16 AM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 02:31:03 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

nvd · CVE-2024-39687

Published

Fedify is a TypeScript library for building federated server apps powered by ActivityPub and other standards. At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network. This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well. Specifically this is a Server Side Request Forgery attack. Users should upgrade to Fedify version 0.9.2, 0.10.1, or 0.11.1 to receive a patch for this issue.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-918

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-07-05T18:15:32.663

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:42:28.413

Source published
5 Jul 2024 18:15:32 UTC
Source modified
17 Jun 2026 07:42:28 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 00:17:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

osv · GHSA-p9cg-vqcc-grcx

Published

### Summary At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the `@id` or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an `@id` that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network. This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well. Specifically this is a [Server Side Request Forgery attack](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery). You can learn more about SSRF attacks via [CWE-918](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html) ### Details When Fedify makes a request at runtime via the DocLoader [1] [2], the `fetch` API does not first check the URI's to assert that it resolve to a public IP address. Additionally, any downstream software of Fedify that may fetch data from URIs contained within Activities or Objects maybe be at risk of requesting non-public resources, and storing those, exposing non-public information to the public. Additionally, in many cases the URIs are not asserted to be either strictly HTTPS or HTTP protocols, which could lead to further attacks, and there is no check that the URI contains a `hostname` part. Whilst the [`fetch()` specification](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/) may provide some safety here, along with underlying fetch implementations, there is still potential for attacks through using `data:` URIs, or just attacking some other protocol entirely, e.g., FTP or CalDav. [1] https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/blob/main/runtime/docloader.ts#L141 [2] https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/blob/main/runtime/docloader.ts#L175 #### Deno-specific Attack Vectors In Deno specifically, the `fetch()` API allows [accessing local filesystem](https://docs.deno.com/deploy/api/runtime-fetch/), I'm not sure how Deno's [Permissions model](https://docs.deno.com/runtime/manual/runtime/permission_apis/) may prevent attacks utilising `file:` URIs. > Fetch also supports fetching from file URLs to retrieve static files. For more info on static files, see the [filesystem API documentation](https://docs.deno.com/deploy/api/runtime-fs). #### ActivityPub Security Considerations This is also noted in the ActivityPub spec in [Section B.3 Security Considerations](https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-localhost), however, there it is more limited in scope. #### Other Implementations It may be acceptable to allow a server operator to allow access to given non-public IP addresses, for instance [in Mastodon](https://github.com/mastodon/mastodon/blob/092bb8a27af9ee87ff9ebabaf354477470ea3a94/app/lib/request.rb#L330) they allow requests to non-public IP addresses, i.e., localhost in development and those in the `ALLOWED_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES` environment variable. ### PoC I'm not sure a PoC is necessary given this is a reasonably well known vulnerability vector. ### Impact This impacts server operates, as resources that are internal to their network may find themselves being improperly accessed or potentially even attacked or exposed to the public. ### Notes for resolution: When implementing public IP address validation, be careful of [CWE-1389](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1389.html) and [CWE-1286](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1286.html) both of which [recently](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-78xj-cgh5-2h22) caused a CVE to be filed against the popular node.js `ip` package, although this package was not originally intended for security purposes.

Source published
5 Jul 2024 20:07:54 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 03:50:16 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:L/SI:N/SA:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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Sources read 16 Nov 18:08 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current