SIPSorcery: Malformed UDP datagram crashes TurnServer receive loop with no restart, disabling TURN UDP relay for all clients (DoS)
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osv · GHSA-pfvm-w89x-94jw
Published## Summary `TurnServer.ReceiveUdpAsync` places its generic `catch (Exception)` OUTSIDE the `while` receive loop, and `Start()` launches the loop fire-and-forget with no supervision or restart. A single pre-authentication UDP datagram whose STUN header first byte is in `0x80–0xFF` causes `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` to throw `ApplicationException`, which unwinds past the loop and terminates it. The TURN UDP relay is then dead for ALL clients until the process is restarted. ## Root Cause `src/SIPSorcery/net/TURN/TurnServer.cs`: - `ReceiveUdpAsync` (:555-577): the inner `try` (:562-567) wraps only `_udpSocket.ReceiveAsync()`; `HandleUdpDatagram(result.Buffer, result.RemoteEndPoint)` (:569) is inside the `while` body but OUTSIDE that inner try. The generic `catch (Exception ex)` (:573) is lexically OUTSIDE the `while`. - `Start()` does `_ = ReceiveUdpAsync();` (:381) — fire-and-forget, no restart. - `HandleUdpDatagram` (:579) calls `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage(data, data.Length)` (:600) for any non-ChannelData datagram; `ParseSTUNMessage` (STUNMessage.cs:94) has no try/catch. ## Impact `ApplicationException` propagates out of the `while`, is caught at :573, logged, and the method returns. `_running` remains true but nothing re-invokes `ReceiveUdpAsync` → TURN UDP relay permanently unavailable for all clients (whole-server DoS). Pre-authentication: STUN parsing precedes any TURN allocation/credential check. ## Proof of Concept Send one UDP datagram to the TURN port (default 3478) with first byte `0x80` (e.g. `80 00 00 00`). `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40` → not ChannelData → `ParseSTUNMessage` → `ParseSTUNHeader` executes `if ((Array[startIndex] & 0xC0) != 0) throw new ApplicationException(...)` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172); `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0` → throws. ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: one UDP datagram to the TURN port, first byte `0x80–0xFF`. Guard: ChannelData branch requires `(data[0] & 0xC0) == 0x40` (:583). Bypass: `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0x40` → falls through to `ParseSTUNMessage` (:600). 2. Sink: `STUNMessage.ParseSTUNMessage` → `STUNHeader.ParseSTUNHeader` (STUNHeader.cs:169-172) throws `ApplicationException`. Guard: none before the throw; `ParseSTUNMessage` has no try/catch. Bypass: `0x80 & 0xC0 = 0x80 ≠ 0` → throws. 3. Impact: exception unwinds past the `while` into `catch(Exception)` at :573 → logged → method returns → loop exits. Guard: none — no restart (`Start()` :381 fire-and-forget). Bypass: N/A. TURN UDP relay dead for all clients until process restart. ## Bypass Evidence - Loop/catch structure: catch at TurnServer.cs:573 is outside the `while` at :559; `HandleUdpDatagram` at :569 is outside the inner try (:562-567). - Unguarded `ParseSTUNMessage` at :600; throw at STUNHeader.cs:169-172. - Fire-and-forget start at :381 with no restart in `Start()`. - `TurnServerConfig.ListenAddress` defaults to `IPAddress.Loopback` (:42), but a functioning TURN server must bind a routable address to serve clients, so real deployments are exposed. Non-default config narrows the vulnerable population, not the attack difficulty → AC:L. ## Affected Versions `nuget:SIPSorcery <= 10.0.13` (TurnServer component present since 10.0.5; verified on release tag v10.0.13 and HEAD). ## Dedup NOT a duplicate of GHSA-28gm-jrmw-xx93 (CVE-2026-54632), which covers the client RTP/ICE socket (`UdpReceiver`/`RTPChannel`). `TurnServer` is a distinct shipped RFC 5766 server component with its own loop and fix location. ## Suggested Fix Wrap `HandleUdpDatagram` in a per-datagram try/log-and-continue INSIDE the `while` (matching the drop-and-continue intent of fix bdb76cb), and/or add loop supervision/restart. --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use
- Source published
- 12 Aug 2026 19:31:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 12 Aug 2026 19:45:11 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 16:01:25 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Publisher rating · HIGH