Hatchet - Unauthenticated OAuth state CSRF / login-CSRF via empty-state collision in ValidateOAuthState
Historical advisory saved 4 Nov 2026 23:56:21 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-phg3-3g28-wq9v
Published### Summary Hatchet version v0.86.26 and below is vulnerable to OAuth state CSRF (login CSRF / account fixation). The vulnerable code clears the session `oauth_state_<integration>` value to the empty string `""` after a successful OAuth callback rather than removing the key, and the subsequent state-equality check then accepts an empty `?state=` parameter on any later callback request — allowing an unauthenticated attacker to bind an already-authenticated victim's session cookie to an attacker-controlled OAuth identity (account takeover via login-CSRF). ### Impact Affected configurations: any deployment that has enabled at least one of `auth.google.enabled`, `auth.github.enabled`, or the Slack integration, and where the victim has completed at least one OAuth flow on that integration in the current session. Bug present on `main` HEAD and in every tagged release up to and including v0.86.26 (commit `243f41d9e1161e70d47dfc0a6509f1c4ddfc9c23`).
- Source published
- 21 Sep 2026 15:47:01 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Nov 2026 23:45:05 UTC
- Saved here
- 4 Nov 2026 23:56:21 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH